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I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2014, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals found that President
Obama violated the due process rights of Ralls, a Delaware company owned
by two Chinese nationals.1 Ralls had acquired four wind farms in northern

1 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The case is extraordinary for
a couple of reasons. First, many believed that Ralls had no right to contest the decision of the Obama
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Oregon, one of which was located within restricted airspace of the U.S.
Navy.2 Six months after the acquisition, President Obama, acting on the recommendation of the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States, ordered Ralls to divest the wind farms. President Obama cited
unspecified but “credible evidence that . . . Ralls . . . might take action . . . to
impair the national security of the United States . . . .”3 Unfortunately, Ralls
did not have access to that evidence.
The President’s refusal to share certain unclassified evidence with Ralls,
and consequent failure to provide Ralls an opportunity to rebut that evidence,
violated its due process rights.4 Hundreds of other wind turbines were located
nearby, many within the Navy’s airspace.5 As the court pointed out, many of
these turbines were both “foreign-made and foreign-owned.”6 It seems unlikely then, that the divestiture order was motivated solely by the fact of foreign ownership or control.7 A fuller explanation would take note of the fact
that the owners were Chinese. As this Article demonstrates, anti-Asian animus informs government policy and decision-making at the highest levels.8
More specifically, this Article probes the intriguing but unexamined issue of why the U.S. government has resisted Asian investment.9 Investment
law and policy are not disciplines frequently mined for anti-Asian bias. Indeed, the prevailing wisdom about U.S. investment policy is its putative
openness to foreigners, both externally (the United States pushes other countries to lower their barriers to investment), and internally (the United States
retains one of the most open investment policies of any modern state). Nevertheless, this Article marshals evidence, from the 1970s to the present, of
hostility to investment from three main sources: the Middle East, China, and
Japan. Drawing on congressional testimony, government investigations,
administration in the first place. Second, few expected that the appellate court would side with the plaintiffs, and force the administration to reveal unclassified evidence about the national security threat of the
wind farms.
2 Id. at 300.
3 Order Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm Project Companies by Ralls Corporation,
77 Fed. Reg. 60,281 (Oct. 3, 2012).
4 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 319.
5 A detailed map of the area is available online through the Canadian newspaper Globe and Mail. See
Too Close for Comfort, THE GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
report-on-business/too-close-for-comfort/article4590399/?from=4590246.
6 Ralls, 758 F.3d at 305.
7 Id. Indeed, one of the prior owners of the wind farms was a Greek-owned corporation based in
Delaware.
8 See infra Part I.B.
9 This Article views Asia expansively, as a geographical region extending from the Middle East
(Saudi Arabia and Gulf States) to East Asia (China and Japan). This interpretation may not conform to
prevailing notions of Asia as “East Asia” or even “South Asia and East Asia.” But proper geography is
not the only redeeming feature of this conception of Asia. It also takes account of the long history of
Orientalism—discourses that ascribe certain motivations, behaviors and values to Asian people. Part III.A
explains Orientalism in detail. See infra notes 230–48 and accompanying text.
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statements from public officials, and decisions to block individual investments, we see strong discomfort, occasionally boiling over into outright hostility, towards Asian capital. Is the United States as open as scholars, government officials and others purport?
Two disclaimers are necessary. First, I do not suggest all Asians are
alike, or somehow constitute a distinct race or ethnicity; I know that Arabs
differ from Japanese people. Nor do I contend that the U.S. government opposes all types of Asian investment all of the time. Rather, the construction
of U.S. investment law and policy stems from responses to investment from
various Asian countries in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s. At the very least, the
United States’ reaction to investment from Asia gives rise to the perception
of anti-Asian bias. Congress has expressed this resistance most vociferously,
fusing populism and nativism to draw attention to certain Asian investments
and blocking some of them. Less often, federal agencies have done the
same.10 Such opposition may have sound national security or economic concerns at heart. But because of the Orientalist rhetoric elected and appointed
officials often use, they create a perception that the United States opposes
investment from certain jurisdictions.11 Perceptions matter here because
many foreign investors, by definition, live outside the United States. When
government officials, elected or appointed, denounce “Arab” or Japanese investors, the investor himself may believe the reason for the opposition is due
to his race or national origin, as opposed to the security or economic concern
the investment may raise.
Second, I do not discount the possibility of other interpretations. Laws,
regulations, and agency decisions respond to a variety of concerns, as explored below. Still, the alternative explanations do not fully account for the
level or intensity of opposition. To borrow a phrase from employment discrimination, some of these cases may involve “mixed motives,” where both
legitimate and illegitimate reasons animate a particular decision.12 This Article posits that illegitimate reasons might have influenced government actors
in particular contexts.
This research is salient for several reasons. First, the United States is
said to maintain an open policy towards foreign direct investment.13 Former
Commerce Secretary Gary Locke claimed that the United States was more to
open to investment than any country in the world.14 Scholars too frequently
10

I thank my colleague Juscelino Colares for this insight.
I explain the concept of Orientalism in greater detail below. See infra Part III.B.
12 See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 93 (2003).
13 See also Stephen D. Krasner, U.S. Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unraveling the Paradox of
External Strength and Internal Weakness, 31 INT’L ORG. 635, 638 (1977). Krasner notes two basic characteristics of the U.S. policy towards international economics: (1) “elimination of barriers to the movements of goods, services, technology, and capital across international boundaries,” and (2) “the control of
such movements by private, as opposed to state-owned, corporations.” Id.
14 Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke Delivers Remarks at U.S.–Russia Business Summit, July 2,
11
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make the claim that the United States treats foreign and domestic investors
alike.15 This research questions that narrative by focusing on key moments in
the construction of U.S. investment law over the past four decades. I am not
the first to detect anti-Asian sentiment in response to individual transactions.16 But no Article has charted these incidents, extracted their anti-Asian
underpinnings, and offered solutions to these problems. We cannot address a
failure we do not acknowledge.
Second, this Article contributes to a growing scholarship on racism
against Asians and Asian-Americans. In the past quarter century, critical legal scholars have examined selected nodes in the United States’ historical
treatment of Asians. From the “free white person” requirement of the 1790
Naturalization Act to the global war on terror, the United States has used laws
and regulations to subordinate, exclude and alienate (literally, “make other”)
Asians and Asian-Americans.17 Despite shifting geopolitical winds, waves of
immigration, and the incomplete project of assimilation, “the Asian is always
seen as an immigrant, as the ‘foreigner-within.’”18 As this Article shows,
anti-Asian sentiment is no historical artifact. It continues to animate statements and, arguably, decisions by high-ranking government actors: senators,
representatives, cabinet officials, and agency staff. Collectively, these determinations not only harm Asians and Asian-Americans within our borders by
perpetuating stereotypes about trustworthiness, citizenship and belonging,
but also antagonize potential investors by suggesting the United States will
not accept their capital.
Third, as the fulcrum of global economic power shifts from West to
East,19 more investors will seek out economic opportunity in the United

2009 (available through Westlaw).
15 See Fred L. Morrison, The Protection of Foreign Investment in the United States of America, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 437, 445 (2010) (“[U.S.] law ordinarily treats foreign and domestic investors or businesses
alike . . . Foreign investors are normally warmly welcomed.”).
16 See, e.g., BILL EMMOTT, THE SUN ALSO SETS: THE LIMITS OF JAPAN’S ECONOMIC POWER (1991).
According to Emmott, former Editor-in-Chief of the Economist news magazine, “racism does exist in
some attitudes toward Japanese investment in America, Australia and, to a lesser extent, Europe.” Id. at
146. Emmott cites the Fujitsu-Fairchild transaction as proof of anti-Japanese bias in U.S. investment policy. For more on Fujitsu-Fairchild, see infra, Part II.A.
17 At this point, a vast literature examines the legal treatment of Asians and Asian-Americans. A
highly incomplete list of important works would include Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the
“Miss Saigon Syndrome,” in ASIAN-AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT 1087 (Hyung-chan Kim ed.,
1992); Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, PostStructuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1241, 1257 (1993); Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and
Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV.
261 (1997); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002).
18 LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 5 (1996).
19 See CTR. FOR ECON. AND BUS. RESEARCH, Cebr’s World Economic League Table, (Dec. 26, 2013)
http://www.telegraaf.nl/incoming/article22168758.ece/BINARY/+Cebr_World-Economic-LeagueTable-2013.pdf (listing China, India, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Taiwan and Saudi Arabia as among the
twenty largest economies by 2028).
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States. As explained more fully below, investors from the Middle East,
China, and Japan have made significant investments in the United States
since the 1970s. They may continue to do so, though this cannot be taken for
granted. Likewise, investors from other emerging economies may also wish
to invest in the United States. U.S. treatment of Asian investment will receive
greater scrutiny from Asian investors themselves. Indeed, Chinese media
puzzle over the “tinted glasses” that U.S. regulators apparently don when
scrutinizing Chinese investment.20 U.S. media likewise have detected a shift
in Chinese investment strategies in the wake of high-profile investment decisions by the United States government.21
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I examines the history of foreign
investment law and policy in the United States. In so doing, it makes the
claim that the construction of U.S. international investment law is, in large
part, a series of reactions to Asian investment. This claim finds support in
congressional testimony by members of the House and Senate, statements of
appointed officials in various cabinets, acts of political theatre, and other indicia of governmental attitudes towards foreign investment. Having surveyed
the bedrock of U.S. investment law, Parts II and III dig into the underlying
sentiments and purposes. Part II asks whether the anti-Asian sentiment serves
primarily political goals. This part examines national security, economic nationalism and concerns over government control as possible explanations for
anti-Asian sentiment. Yet, as Part III makes clear, racially discriminatory attitudes also animate policy decisions and statements, at least in certain situations. Invoking critical legal studies, cultural studies, and racial discrimination lawsuits, Orientalism—a set of outmoded beliefs about Asian culture,
people, and societies—continues to inform government thinking and decision-making at the highest levels. Since many decisions are made in confidential settings, the public record—statements by politicians, congressional

20 See 21-SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST CENTURY ECONOMIC TIMES], Zhongguo Qiye Ruhe Fangfan
Meiguo Touzi Anquan Shencha Fengxian [How Can Chinese Companies Guard Against Risks of U.S.
Investment Security Review], (Sept. 7, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20150907/
084423172831.shtml. “Although the American is one of the world’s most open markets, its security review process for foreign investment is particularly stringent. For Chinese companies especially, the America’s national security review seems to wear ‘tinted glasses.’ From the early defeat of CNOOC’s bid for
Unocal and Huawei’s thwarted attempts to invest in the United States, to the recent failure by Sany to
invest in wind farms, Chinese investors face especially interesting security barriers in U.S. mergers and
acquisitions.” See also Ben White, Chinese Drop Bid to Buy U.S. Oil Firm, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2005)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080200404.html (“CNOOC
Chairman Fu Chengyu and other executives and directors were shocked by the intensity of the negative
reaction from Congress and by signals that the administration did not want to decide whether to accept or
reject [CNOOC’s bid for Unocal].”).
21 See
Isabella Steger, Cnooc’s Unocal Lessons, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2012)
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/07/23/cnoocs-unocal-lessons/ (noting that, since CNOOC’ failed bid for
Unocal, Chinese firms have sought minority stakes in North American energy companies).
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testimony, and actions often unaccompanied by detailed explanation—is often the only place to which outside observers can turn for information. Part
IV aims to redress some of these problems by prescribing courses of action
for the judicial, executive, and legislative branches.
II. A HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES
For most of its history, the United States has advocated free capital
flows, minimal barriers to foreign investment, and strong protections for U.S.
investment in other countries.22 With certain exceptions—the Alien Property
Law (1887), Trading with the Enemy Act (1917)—the United States has
largely followed Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton’s advice: foreign
capital “ought to be considered a most valuable auxiliary conducing to put in
motion a greater quantity of productive labor and a greater portion of useful
enterprise than could exist without it.”23
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, most inbound investment originated in Europe, primarily the United Kingdom (England and
Scotland).24 The long historical relationship between Europe and the United
States helped forge U.S. attitudes towards foreign investment. Significant
emigration from Western Europe, both before and after the founding of the
United States, helped create the conditions for a liberal investment policy. A
shared language yoked the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States,
creating an atmosphere of trust and ease of communication that facilitated
investment flows. The fact that foreign capital, and the businesses into which
they were investing, were owned mostly by white Europeans, and their U.S.born descendants, likely contributed to the tacit confidence in foreign investment. As one contemporary British investor put it, “When we’re in America,
we feel it’s reasonable to behave like Americans. But that’s not so different
from behaving like an Englishman.”25 This may be one reason why people
from the United States have paid so little attention to British or European
22 The most comprehensive treatment of foreign investment in the United States is Mira Wilkinson’s
two-volume treatise. See MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
TO 1914 (1989) [hereinafter WILKINS I]; MIRA WILKINS, THE HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 1914-1945 (2004) [hereinafter WILKINS II].
23 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES: COMMUNICATED TO THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES (1791). He went on to note that “every farthing of foreign capital . . . laid out in internal meliorations, and in industrial establishments of a permanent nature, is a precious acquisition.” Id.
24 See WILKINS I, supra note 22, at 159. From the late 1890s to the early 1910s, depending on the
year, British investors supplied approximately 60% to 80% of FDI into the United States; see also
WILKINS II, supra note 22, at 622 (noting that Britain made the most investment in the United States
during 1914 to 1945).
25 John Burgess, British Investments in U.S. Outpaces Japan’s, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Jan. 27,
1989),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1989/01/27/british-investments-in-us-outpace-japans-study-finds/4ff175c6-018f-4102-b877-203954aa672c/.
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investment.
Asian investment, however, provoked a very different reaction. The first
Asian capital flows, which entered the United States in the early 1970s, provoked a strong and largely negative reaction. Members of Congress called
for restrictions on foreign investment, and set into motion a familiar pattern:
(1) capital flows from a particular jurisdiction; (2) negative, often racially
tinged statements about the dangers of investment from that country; (3) calls
for laws to restrict investment, and occasionally passage of such laws; and
(4) empowering the executive branch to stanch foreign investment. We explore this pattern in greater detail below.
A. The First Wave of Asian Investment: The 1970s
In the 1970s, the United States experienced major shifts in inbound investment. First, foreign direct investment (FDI) accelerated over the course
of the 1970s, nearly quadrupling between 1970 and 1980, and increased significantly after 1973.26 Though still small when compared to outbound U.S.
investment,27 large amounts of inbound investment sparked concern that the
United States was losing its economic sovereignty. Foreign investors controlled increasingly large amounts of land, stocks, treasury bills, and other
assets. This led some to state that foreigners were “invading” the United
States, taking advantage of U.S. economic stagnation and political turmoil to
snap up prized properties and struggling blue-chip companies.28
Second, a small fraction of this capital originated in Asia. At this time,
the primary investors in the United States were Western.29 But Japan and a
handful of Middle Eastern countries (Kuwait, Iran and Saudi Arabia) began
to make sizeable investments, many for the first time. They invested in sectors such as hotels, real estate, mining, banks, airlines, and telecommunica-

26 United States Senate Comm. on Commerce, Impact of Foreign Investments in the United States:
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Foreign Commerce & Tourism, 93rd Cong. (1973) (statement of Sen.
Daniel Inouye, Chairman, Subcomm. on Foreign Comm. & Tourism) [hereinafter Tourism Subcomm.
Hearings]. Sen. Inouye noted “In the first half of 1973, foreign investment was running at an annual rate
of $1.5 billion, up approximately nine times from the $160 million in 1972.” Id. at 1. Inbound FDI had
increased steadily in the prior two decades, doubling between 1950 and 1960, and doubling again between
1960 and 1970. Id. See also EARL H. FRY, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 9 (1981).
27 See infra Part IIC.
28 See infra notes 150–57 and accompanying text.
29 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Detail for Position, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Aug. 1980 through 1990. A helpful chart summarizing this can
be found in EDWARD M. GRAHAM & PAUL R. KRUGMAN, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 43 (2d ed. 1991). Japanese FDI increased steadily from 1980 to 1990. Yet even at its apex, in
1990, Japanese investment was still second to British investment, surpassing Dutch investment only in
1988.
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tions. In so doing, they encountered intense and occasionally insensitive scrutiny from the media, congressional hearings, and even popular culture.30 Contemporary commentators called it “reverse investment.”31 For the first time
in U.S. history, investment originated in countries where the United States
had long enjoyed the dominant position, by virtue of U.S. corporate presence,
economic support, security guarantees, or some combination thereof.32
Alongside the influx of Asian capital came the realization that international
influence was a two-way street. The United States still maintained military,
diplomatic and political leverage over these countries, but the economic
power no longer tipped so decisively in its favor. This change had lasting
reverberations in both the national psyche and foreign policy of the United
States.
What were these investments? Who were these investors? In the early
1970s, the first major wave of Japanese investment reached U.S. shores,
touching down most prominently in Hawaii’s tourism sector.33 Japanese interests purchased three, of a total of forty-four, golf resorts.34 Other Japanese
30 Most famously, Howard Beale, the fictional anchorman of the Oscar-winning Network, served up
an anti-Arab diatribe that continues to resonate in U.S. popular culture. He implored his viewers in the
following way, “Right now the Arabs have screwed us out of enough American dollars to come right back
and, with our own money, buy General Motors, IBM, ITT, AT&T, DuPont, US Steel and twenty other
American companies . . . The Arabs are simply buying us . . . I want you to get up right now and write a
telegram to President Ford saying ‘I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take this any more. I don’t want
the banks selling my country to the Arabs.’” See NETWORK (United Artists 1976).
31 Tourism Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 2. The testimony of Hawaiian governor George
Ariyoshi is quite revealing on this subject. “We know, of course, of the history of colonialism, and how . . .
the powerful nations of the world exploited the natural resources of underdeveloped lands, primarily for
the profit of sometimes greedy and very power [sic] entrepreneurs. That age is dying. We are now in the
age of multinationals and the rising expectations of smaller and poorer nations. The Arab countries with
their sophisticated management of their own oil resources furnish an example of countries which have
learned a few lessons from earlier exploiters. And today, too, we have the ‘reverse investments’ in the
United States by foreign investors who come from lands devastated in World War II, rebuilt by American
aid in vast quantities, and now often our business competitors. Those ‘reverse investment’ in many cases
can provide jobs, income, and new vocational opportunities for Americans. They can also cause regional
conflicts and competitive battles.” Id. at 5.
32 For example, the United States helped install the Shah of Iran in 1953, and invested heavily in the
state until his fall in 1979. See generally Saeed Kamali Dehghan & Richard Norton-Taylor, CIA admits
role in 1953 Iranian coup, GUARDIAN (Aug. 19, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
aug/19/cia-admits-role-1953-iranian-coup (describing U.S. government support for the overthrow of democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq); Stephen McGlinchey, How the Shah
Entangled America, NAT’L INTEREST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-theshah-entangled-america-8821 (describing U.S. military and economic support for the Shah, whom the
U.S. helped install after ousting Mosaddeq). Likewise, after World War II, the United States occupied
Japan for six years, rewrote its constitution, and attempted to imprint U.S.-style democracy in various
Japanese institutions. See WARREN I. COHEN, THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS 60 (2013).
33 Tourism Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 26, at 45–46 (statement of Frank F. Fasi, Mayor of Honolulu).
34 Id. at 14 (statement of Edward Greaney, Deputy Director, Department of Planning and Economic
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investors bought high-end hotels, including three prominent establishments
on Waikiki Beach.35 In addition to condominiums and real estate parcels of
various sizes, Japanese investors purchased 11% of Hawaii’s available hotel
rooms.36 While certain plots were quite large, Japanese investors ended up
owning less than 1% of Hawaiian land.37 Despite their relatively small size,
however, these purchases triggered resentment, as explored more fully below.38
A far more pressing concern was Middle Eastern investment, particularly from Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These transactions stoked significant public and congressional concern.39 They staked out significant, but not
controlling, positions in well-known companies.40 Kuwaiti investors, including the Kuwaiti government,41 invested in both real estate and corporate
stock. A Kuwaiti government official explained his country’s strategy in the
following terms:
We are studying dozens of proposals for equity investment from
American companies, many of them well-known names. We are much
more interested in long-term growth investment in productive enterprise than we are in fixed-interest direct obligations. For this we see
the best opportunities in the big American economy and in West Germany.42

Real estate investments included Kiawah Island, off the coast of South Carolina, where Kuwaitis sought to develop luxury resorts.43 The son of Kuwait’s prime minister purchased the Hilton Hotel in downtown Baltimore for

Development, State of Hawaii).
35 Id.
36 Id. The development office produced a list of Japanese investments for the hearing. See Chronological Listing of Major Japanese Investments in Hawaii (showing Japanese acquisitions of land, supermarkets, hotels, real estate, golf courses and others). Id. at 19–20.
37 Id. at 68.
38 See Bruce Benson, Foreign Investors Stir Hawaii, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 1973), at A4 (noting
Senator Inouye received over 100 letters in 1975 “with complaints relating mostly to Japanese [investments]. You seldom hear anything about British investments, for example . . . .”).
39 Roberta Hornig, Arab Money No Threat, Simon Says, WASH. STAR (Feb. 26, 1975) (transcribing
an interview with Treasury Secretary William Simon).
40 Joseph Lawrence, Should America Welcome Saudi Investment?, INDEPENDENT PRESS-TELEGRAM
(Oct. 31, 1975), at 31.
41 One reason for some U.S. citizens’ discomfort with Arab investment was the difficulty in delineating private from public money. As one contemporaneous article put it, “the government officials making
the decisions on petrodollar aid and trade are related to, in business with, or even the same person as the
private investor who puts his money into allied projects.” Jim Hoagland, Private/Public Line Blurs,
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 1975), at A1.
42 Lawrence, supra note 40.
43 See John McDermott, Even on Kiawah, Nothing Lasts Forever, POST & COURIER (June 9, 2013),
http://www.postandcourier.com/business/even-on-kiawah-nothing-lasts-forever/article_474399f9-46695674-b920-8308df491304.html. The Kuwait Investment Company purchased Kiawah Island in 1974 to
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$20 million.44 Outside of the United States, Kuwaiti investors bought “boutique” real estate in London, Paris, and Egypt;45 and took a 14% stake in
Daimler-Benz, the German manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz automobiles.46
Iran, a nominal U.S. ally until 1979,47 likewise invested in a range of
industries, including aviation. The country’s main aim in making these investments was economic development.48 Iran negotiated, but ultimately did
not consummate, a $300 million stake in the then-troubled (later bankrupt)
Pan Am Airlines.49 Instead, it purchased jets from TWA.50 The Bank of Iran
also extended a $75 million loan to the financially troubled defense contractor Grumman, at least part of which went to a $1.7 billion dollar fighter-jet
purchase.51 Iranian banks also invested in real estate, including a $500 million project with offices, apartments, and a shopping mall in New Orleans.52
As part of its diversification scheme, Iran also made significant investments
in Egypt53 and purchased a 25% interest in Krupp, the West German steel
maker.54
Saudi Arabia, another nominal U.S. ally, sought a safe place to deposit
its newfound wealth. Many investors chose bank deposits, corporate stocks,
and U.S. treasury bills.55 One Saudi official stated that his government sought
primarily portfolio investment, but would not seek to control more than 5%
of the shares of any particular U.S. company.56 Indeed, according to one U.S.
spokesperson for a Saudi bank, Saudi investors did not want “to be involved

develop a world-class resort. The Kuwaitis sold the island in 1988 to KRA, a real estate development
firm. Id.
44 Peter Arnett, Wave of Foreign Investment Washing Across U.S., WASH. POST (July 24, 1979), D7,
D9.
45 Michael Ross, Persian Gulf Oil States: New Power Center Arising? NASHUA TELEGRAPH (Mar.
10, 1975).
46 See id.
47 This is not to suggest that the United States and Iran have been close allies. The United States
helped overthrow democratically elected Prime Minister Mosaddeq, and installed the Shah of Iran, in
1953. The United States provided military and financial support for the Shah until his 1979 ouster. JAMES
G. BLIGHT, BECOMING ENEMIES 35–36 (2012).
48 See Hornig, supra note 39, at A6.
49 Marilyn Berger & Jack Egan, Pan Am, Iran Eye Deal, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 1975), A1, A10.
50 Id. at A10.
51 See Jack Egan, Petrodollar Glut Raises Foreign Investment Questions, WASH. POST, (Dec. 10,
1974), D10 (noting that Iran offered the loan when Grumman’s financial situation threatened the production of the plane); See Jim Hoagland, Lockheed & the Arab Investors, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 1974), at A18.
52 Thomas Brooks, Iran Bank Puts up Development Cash, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 1976), at E10.
53 Jim Hoagland, Shah Pushing Closer Ties to Arab Nations, WASH. POST (May 27, 1974), at A21.
54 Iran Buys 25.01% Share of Krupp Conglomerate, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 1976), at C11. This deal
followed Iran’s 1974 purchase of a 25.04% interest in a Krupp subsidiary that produced steel.
55 Thomas W. Lippman, Saudis Look West to Invest Year’s $17 Billion Surplus, WASH. POST (Feb.
14, 1977), at D11; Youssef M. Ibrahim, U.S.-Arab Interests Form Banking Unit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20,
1978), at D1.
56 Hobart Rowen, Saudi Sees Little U.S. Investment, WASH. POST (June 8, 1975), at A2.
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in any takeover operations, and will go only where [they] are wanted.”57
These investors must have been aware of the resentment and frustration many
people from the United States directed towards the Saudi government after
the oil shocks of the 1970s. They likely sought to keep a low profile to avoid
suspicion.58
Saudi investors also acquired substantial interest in U.S. banks, including the Commonwealth Bank of Detroit.59 In addition to being a safe place to
invest, banks taught Saudi financiers about the operations of the U.S. financial system. As Ghaith Pharaon, the primary investor in the Detroit deal,
noted, the bank provided connections to industrial giants like General Motors, Dow Chemicals, and Parke-David pharmaceuticals. These companies
sought to invest in Saudi Arabia.60
This may seem like a lot of money, but despite the rhetoric, Asian investment was dwarfed by Western holdings. In 1976, OPEC countries, as the
U.S. government then classified them, owned less than 1% of foreign direct
investment in the United States.61 Their share of U.S. portfolio investment
exceeded this percentage, reaching a peak of 11% of total foreign-owned investment for one year before settling down into the low single digits.62 With
such modest holdings, OPEC—even at its brief apex—lacked the financial
clout to sink the U.S. economy.
1. Congress Reacts
Congress reacted to the first wave of Asian investment in several ways.
Members of Congress introduced over a dozen bills to scrutinize, restrict, or
57 Id. The article describes how Kuwaiti, Saudi and Emirati merchant families formed an investment
bank, Petra, to invest in the U.S. stock market.
58 See also Edward Cowan, U.S.-Saudi Talks to Open This Week, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 1975), at 5
(“Persian Gulf states want to know what industries Washington regards as closed to foreign investment
or what the investment limits might be.”).
59 Foreign Investment Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong. 58, 81 (1975) (statement of James L. Pate, Ass. Sec’y for Econ. Aff., Dep’t.
of Comm.) [hereinafter Foreign Investment Act Hearings].
60 William K. Stevens, Saudi Sees U.S. Bank as a ‘Catalyst,’ N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 1975), at 43. The
deal incited significant local opposition, “most noticeably from the Jewish community.” One Detroit lawyer, who claimed to own 59 shares of preferred stock, said he did not want to see Arabs or any other
foreigners get “a stranglehold on America.” Id. at 54.
61 Information about investment positions in the United States are gleaned from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (https://www.bea.gov/scb/date_guide.asp). Ida May Mantel,
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 1976, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 26, 35–37 (Oct.
1977), http://bea.gov/scb/pdf/1977/1077cont.pdf.
62 See Russell B. Scholl, The International Investment Position of the United States: Developments
in 1975, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 29, 32 (Aug. 1976) (listing total foreign-owned assets),
https://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/1976/0876cont.pdf. See also Christopher L. Bach, OPEC Transaction in the
U.S. International Accounts, 1972-1977, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 21, 22 (Apr. 1978) (listing assets owned by OPEC countries), http://bea.gov/scb/pdf/1978/0478cont.pdf.
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require public disclosure of foreign investment.63 In the end, only two bills
became law, serving primarily to collect information on foreign investment.64
Anti-Asian sentiment first appeared in Congressional hearings on Japanese investment in Hawaii.65 Bankers, journalists, officials, and businessmen
described a sharp uptick in Japanese investment in the early 1970s.66 They
also noted the widespread and generally negative reaction of many Hawaiians.67
A recurring theme at the hearings, conducted by Japanese-American
Senator Daniel Inouye, was “anti-Japanese racism.”68 The Governor of Hawaii testified that citizens of Hawaii expressed “fear and suspicions about the
motives of foreign investors.”69 He also noted “how unrewarding and dangerous” such attitudes were.70 A Hawaiian newspaper publisher, reflecting
on recent media coverage, observed “racial undertones to the negative reactions” of the general public towards Japanese investment and Asian investment more generally.71 The publisher cited examples where Japanese investments aroused public attention and contrasted that with the lack of “public
indignation or emotional response” toward investors from Britain or Canada.72
Some anti-Japanese sentiment may have stemmed from Japan’s 1941
attack on Pearl Harbor, which prompted the United States to enter World War
II. Despite a generation of cooperation, and a strong political alliance between the two countries, some people from the United States may have borne
a grudge against the citizens of a former enemy. This is not to justify animosity against Japanese investment, but rather to suggest a possible explanation
for its origins.
Congress also convened hearings to review Middle Eastern investment
in the United States. Unlike the Japanese tourism hearings, where participants reported on anti-Japanese pronouncements, the Senators themselves
63 Peter Milius, Arabs Investing Cautiously: Feared Intrusions into U.S. Economy Not Developing,
WASH. POST (June 1, 1975), at 2.
64 These include the Foreign Investment Study Act, Pub. L. No. 93-479 (1974), and the International
Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-472 (1976). Both collect information on inbound investment.
65 See Tourism Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 26, at 33 (statement of Kideo Kajikawa, President,
Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce). Indeed, according to one speaker, the term “foreign investments in Hawaii” means “Japanese investments, even though there are numerous investors from the continental United States, Great Britain, Canada and other countries in the world.” Id.
66 Id. at 68 (statement of Russell A. Taussig. Prof. Finance, Univ. Hawaii) While Japanese investment
in Hawaii remained constant for the 1970s, it increased 20% in 1971 and 50% in 1972).
67 Id. at 67. One report indicated that 66% of Hawaiian residents opposed additional Japanese investment in Hawaii.
68 Id. at 30. This was not the only reason cited for public outcry to Japanese investment.
69 Id. at 4 (statement of Hon. George Ariyoshi, Governor of Hawaii).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 39–40 (statement of George Mason, President, Crossroads Press, Inc.).
72 Id. at 40.
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expressed discriminatory sentiment. Take the following conflation of Arabs
with Nazis by New York republican, Jacob Javits:
The Arabs say [there is a war going on]. They say they put a boycott
on the world. They jacked up the price [on oil] in order to make the
world do what they want to do in the war against the Israelis. That is
what they say. You know, we learned from Hitler, you have to take
them at their word.73

Senator Javits’s testimony is extraordinary in many ways. The use of the indeterminate word “Arabs” condemns an entire ethnicity for the actions of a
tiny elite. The comparison to Hitler likewise defies logic. Yet it forms part of
the oppositional discourse politicians use to raise suspicions about foreign
investment.
Javits also feared that “Arabs” would take over U.S. blue-chip companies. When that happens, “control will be exercised by people who as a group
are technologically backward [and] subject to the direction of governments
which have no mastery of the complexities of the multinational corporation
and its operations or of the public interest involved.”74 Javits incited fear of
Asian capital by suggesting that Arabs, who lacked the intelligence to manage multinational corporations, would try to “take over” U.S. companies.
Javits was hardly alone in his fear of Arabs.
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Democrat of Ohio, also voiced concern
about “Arab” control of U.S. companies. He believed that OPEC nations
would use their newfound wealth “to acquire uncontested control of 51 percent of the voting stock in eleven of our largest companies [including] A.T.
& T., Boeing, Dow Chemical, General Dynamics, General Motors, IBM,
ITT, Lockheed, United Airlines, U.S. Steel and Xerox.”75 He further surmised that “by 1979, the OPEC nations would have enough surplus dollars . . . to buy 100 percent of all of the stock of all of the companies listed
on the [New York Stock Exchange].”76
Metzenbaum decried the “nouveau riche OPEC nations” for their “reckless disregard for public responsibility. They are determined that with their
wealth they will go where they want, and do what they please. As is so typical
of the nouveau riche, they expect to use their wealth to exercise economic,
political and social pressure.”77 Despite Metzenbuam’s characterizations,
Middle Eastern investors primarily sought to diversify their portfolios, develop domestic industries, gain exposure to capital markets, and learn about

73 Foreign Investment Act Hearings, supra note 59, at 41 (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits, Member,
Senate Banking Committee).
74 Id. at 44.
75 Id. at 58 (statement of Ret. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 59.
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corporate governance. Many of the blue-chip companies in which they invested—Pan Am, AT&T, Krupp—deployed advanced technologies. If anything, Middle Eastern investors were using capital to modernize their economies, and reduce their reliance on oil revenues.
To be sure, geopolitics incited some of the anti-Arab sentiment. The Oil
Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC)—of which Saudi Arabia, Iran,
and Kuwait were all members—quadrupled the price of gasoline in 1973.
The “oil shocks,” which contributed to America’s longest economic recession since the Great Depression,78 as well as high unemployment rates and a
long period of inflation surely contributed to resentment against Middle Eastern investment.79 In this harsh economic climate, Middle Eastern investors
proved easy scapegoats, despite the fact that their economic presence benefited capital-starved U.S. businesses.
Arab investors seized on congressional attitudes.80 One Saudi official
noted that Congress’s reaction made some Saudis believe their investments
were not secure in the United States.81 He overstated his claim that, “We are
not going to invest in the Western world at all.”82 But his concern was valid.
Congressional testimony sends strong signals to outside observers, particularly those unfamiliar with the rough and tumble of congressional politics. A
critical remark about foreign investors may score easy points for a U.S. politician, but it could also appear as front-page news in the foreign country so
criticized.83
2. The Birth of CFIUS
By 1975, the use of the term “foreign investment” signaled anxiety over
Asian investment. Congressional hearings revealed tensions about Japanese
investment in Hawaii and Middle Eastern portfolio investment. Members of
Congress responded with a spate of bills to restrict foreign investment.84
78 See NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions,
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) (listing various recessions from the 1850s to
the present).
79 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?years_option=all_years&
periods_option=specific_ periods&periods=Annual+Data (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
80 Hobart Rowen, Investing Plan Cut by Arabs, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 1975), at F2. The article describes a Treasury official’s visit to the Middle East, where he found officials in Abu Dhabi, Kuwait and
Qatar disturbed over U.S. fears that Arab investors sought to take control of U.S. companies. The officials
stressed that they are mainly interested in minority positions of a portfolio nature and in real estate.
81 Hobart Rowen, Saudi Sees Little U.S. Investment, WASH. POST (June 8, 1975), at A2. Saudi officials told a Treasury official that the Saudi government is interested in portfolio investments “not to exceed 5 per cent of any one company.”
82 Id.
83 Ikuo Kabashima & Hideo Sato, Local Content and Congressional Politics: Interest-group Theory
and Foreign-policy Implications, 30 INT’L STUDIES QUARTERLY, 295, 297 (1986).
84 John C. Culver, Foreign Investment in the United States, 16 FOREIGN POLICY 159 (1974).
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The Ford Administration sought to allay congressional concerns and
maintain America’s traditionally open investment environment85 by establishing the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States,
(CFIUS).86 Through CFIUS, the Ford Administration maintained executive
branch control over investment policy; it would retain the United States’ traditional openness to foreign investment and reinforce political alliances
across Asia. By bringing together eight federal agencies,87 CFIUS ensured
that foreign investment still flowed into the United States and broadly served
the national interest.
CFIUS is commonly regarded as the genesis of U.S. investment law.
Together with the 1988 Exon-Florio Amendments and the 2007 Foreign Investment and National Security Act, CFIUS forms a key plank of the regulatory apparatus.88 At its inception, then, U.S. investment law responded to fear
of Asian investment. In continuing this historical overview, this foundational
concern resurfaces regularly.
B. The Second Asian Wave: The 1980s
The second major wave of Asian investment reached U.S. shores in the
1980s. While the first wave of Japanese investment into Hawaii faced local
resistance, its second wave incurred a hostile reception of national proportions in the 1980s. Why? Japan’s economic success in the 1960s and 1970s
made it the United States’ main economic rival by the 1980s.89 Across a wide
range of products—television sets, stereos, cars, motorcycles, computers,
semiconductors—Japanese companies manufactured goods often superior in
quality and generally comparable (or lower) in price than their U.S. counterparts.
At the same time, Japan maintained relatively high barriers to trade and

85 Jack Egan, U.S. to Propose Informal Foreign Investment Curbs, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 1975), at
F1 (noting the Ford Administration’s fear that the broad-brush approach of the proposed Foreign Investment Act could trigger retaliation against U.S. investments abroad, or reduce foreign investment in the
US).
86 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975). While membership has changed over
the years, the current composition includes the heads of the following departments and offices: Treasury,
Justice, Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, Energy, State, Science and Technology Policy. See U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY, Composition of CFIUS, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
87 Executive Order 11858 lists the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce; the U.S.
Trade Representative; the Chairman of the Council of Economic, the Attorney General, and the Director
of Office and Management and Budget. Id. at 1(a).
88 This Article does not discuss the 1992 Byrd Amendment, which expanded CFIUS’ investigatory
remit to include government-controlled investments. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL34082, EXON-FLORIO FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROVISION, COMPARISON OF H.R. 556 & S. 1610 13
(2007).
89 Japan was the world’s third largest economy in 1970, behind the United States and Soviet Union.
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investment. This hurt U.S. exporters looking to break into the Japanese market, and it also created barriers for U.S. investors.90 The result was an increasingly large trade deficit between Japan and the United States—one that persists to this day.91 This imbalance heightened tensions between the two
countries and led to a series of negotiations, accommodations, and agreements to defuse tensions.
Japanese investment increased over the course of the 1980s. By 1990,
Japan was the largest investor in the United States.92 Japanese investors were
active in banking, manufacturing (cars, electronics, machinery), and real estate.93 The Japanese government also accumulated large quantities of U.S.
government debt. From the point of view of the trade deficit, Japanese direct
investment should have been welcome. When Honda builds a factory in Ohio
(or Nissan in Tennessee, Toyota in Kentucky, or Mitsubishi in Illinois), it
manufactures cars in the United States. These products contribute to U.S.
manufacturing, reduce U.S. purchases of Japanese goods, and theoretically
reduce the trade deficit.94
Yet many in Congress criticized Japanese investment.95 They highlighted the negative effects of Japanese economic relations with the United
States, introduced bills to restrict foreign investment, and engaged in political

90 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade Friction with Japan and the American Response, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1647, 1656 (1984) (noting Japanese efforts to lower barriers to trade and investment in the 1970s
and 1980s); Peter Reynolds, Foreign Investment in Japan: The Legal and Social Climate, 18 TEX. INT’L
L. J. 175, 186–89 (1983) (describing three increasingly less restrictive phases of Japanese investment policy from World War II to 1983).
91 In 2013, the U.S. logged a $73.4 billion trade deficit with Japan, though it is rarely mentioned in
major media. One reason might be the U.S.’s $318.7 billion trade deficit with China, which tends to capture more headlines. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Trade in Goods with China, https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
92 GRAHAM & KRUGMAN, supra note 29, at 22.
93 See id. at 24–28; Cristina Lee, Japan’s US Investments Top $10 Billion, J. COMM., Aug. 12, 1987
(discussing Japanese investment in electrical machinery, general machinery and transportation equipment).
94 Of course, international investment also helps transfer advanced technologies to the United States,
and employs U.S. workers.
95 Many Members of Congress expressed anti-Japanese sentiment in congressional hearings. This
article, however, focuses only on those statements relating to Japanese trade and investment. For additional statements, see Associated Press, Some Japanese-Americans hear bigotry in harsh trade talks,
NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Apr. 11, 1985. The article recounts several anti-Japanese statements made by U.S.
Members of Congress, in congressional hearings. Senator John Danforth complained the Japanese “are
sucking the world dry.” Senator Ernest Hollings noted the Japanese “love all those bowings – they have
been doing that for 25 years and getting away with it.” Senator John Heinz noted when the “Japanese get
their little fork into U.S. – or chopsticks . . . they really to stick it to us.” Representative Richard Schulze
submitted into testimony a letter, describing a Japanese negotiating technique, that read “The Japs even
have a word for it called ‘harage’ which basically means saying one thing when you really mean the
opposite.” The congressman is referring to haragei (literally, “stomach art”), a form of indirection where
one expresses his intention through non-verbal means, rather than direct language.
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theatre. They linked Japanese investment to twentieth century colonial expansion, surmising that Japan once again aspired to “worldwide dominance”
in the semiconductor industry.96 Representative Helen Bentley pursued the
analogy even further, referencing the “corporate war machines of both Germany and Japan.”97 She cited Japan’s colonial project in the early twentieth
century as proof of its imperial ambitions in the 1980s.98
U.S.–Japan economic tensions came to a head when Toshiba, a Japanese
computer company, sold advanced tools to Russia, violating an international
agreement to ban high-tech exports to the Soviet bloc.99 Members of Congress immediately denounced Japan. They congregated on Capitol Hill before a group of reporters, smashed a Toshiba radio, and called for a consumer
boycott of Toshiba products.100
The recital revealed much about congressional anxiety over Japan. First,
by holding the performance on Capitol Hill, Members of Congress made their
statement on highly symbolic ground. Second, the violence itself was striking. To the extent the general public saw members of Congress, at least in
the mid-1980s, it was typically in scripted speeches on the House floor. Publicly smashing a radio departs from the decorous behavior normally associated with elected representatives. Third, and most germane to this Article’s
thesis, the violence only targeted a Japanese entity. Kongsberg, a Norwegian
state-owned defense contractor, also sold sensitive software to the Soviet Union in the same transaction.101 Yet no one in Congress burned a Kongsberg
effigy, or publicly directed animosity towards the European company. Later,
the Senate banned both Toshiba and Kongsberg from exporting equipment

96 Semiconductors and the Electronics Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Science, Tech.,
and Space, 101st Cong. 70 (1990) (statement of Peter H. Mills, Senior Vice President, Administration,
Sematech).
97 136 Cong. Rec. H2036-04 (1990) (statement of Rep. Bentley).
98 Id. at H2038. Representative Bentley’s proof of recent Japanese imperialism was the construction
of Japanese schools in the United States, and retirement homes in Australia.
99 John Burgess, Japan Worries that Scandal Has Hurt Relations with U.S., WASH. POST, (July 16,
1987), at E1. The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (Cocom) was established to
restrict transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Union and other communist nations. The enforcement
mechanism depended upon the voluntary cooperation of the various members. See generally Wende A.
Wrubel, The Toshiba-Kongsberg Incident: Shortcoming of Cocom, and Recommendations for Increased
Effectiveness of Export Controls to the East Bloc, 4 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 241, 244, 265 (1989).
100 Dave Skidmore, State Department Says Punitive Efforts May Backfire, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July
1, 1987).
101 David E. Sanger, Retaliation Demanded in High-Tech Diversion, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 1987), at
D1.
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to the United States for a number of years.102 Nonetheless, the political theater and negative characterizations targeted only Toshiba, not Kongsberg.103
1. CFIUS Responds to Japan: Fujitsu & Fairchild
Toshiba was not the only Japanese company to make headlines in the
United States. Shortly before the radio-smashing incident, a proposed Japanese investment thrust CFIUS into national headlines.104 The Japanese computer company Fujitsu sought to buy Fairchild, a pioneering high-tech company once known as “the progenitor of Silicon Valley.”105 In 1979, French
multinational Schlumberger purchased Fairchild for $425 million.106
Schlumberger tried to revive the company’s fortune107 but seven years later
decided to sell its stake to Fujitsu for $200 million.108 However, CFIUS’s
investigation into the transaction,109 as well as strong opposition from cabinet
officials,110 pushed Fujitsu to withdraw its bid.111
When U.S. Deputy Trade Representative Mike Smith (then in Brazil)
heard that Fujitsu dropped its bid, his reaction was telling. According to the
Los Angeles Times, Smith “jumped from his chair, thrust both fists high over
his head in a traditional Japanese salute and trumpeted: ‘Banzai! Banzai!’”112
Smith’s conduct evoked Japanese fighter pilots from World War II, who

102 . . . But Not That, WASH. POST (July 3, 1987) at A26 (“Reverting to the politics of the sledgehammer in the U.S.–Japanese alliance would massively and stupidly compound the damage done by the
Toshiba affair.”).
103 As Senator Jake Garn testified before the Senate Subcommittee on International Finance and Monetary Policy, “[i]t’s time that an example be made of Toshiba . . . We ought to really hurt Toshiba and let
the word out to high-technology manufacturers around the world.” Sanger, supra note 101.
104 See, e.g., Stuart Auerbach, Cabinet to Weigh Sale of Chip Firm: Fujitsu Bid Provokes Unusual
U.S. Move, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 1987) at E1 (recounting Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge’s
comments to a group of reporters that Fujitsu’s takeover should be blocked); David E. Sanger, Japanese
Purchase of Chip Maker Canceled After Objections in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 1987), at A1.
105Andrew Pollack, Fairchild Being Sold to National: Schlumberger Accepts Offer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
1, 1987), at D1.
106 Victor F. Zonana, Schlumberger Will Sell Its Ailing Fairchild Unit: National Semiconductor Will
Pay $122 Million; Analysts Describe Deal for Chip Maker as a ‘Steal,’ L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 1987), at 1.
107 See Eduardo Lachica, Pentagon Split on Implications of Bid by Fujitsu for Fairchild Semiconductor, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 1986), at 4. Fairchild was bleeding tens of millions of dollars a year by the
mid-1980s.
108 Pollack, supra note 105.
109 Lachica, supra note 107.
110 Auerbach, supra note 104.
111 National Semiconductor, a U.S. high-technology firm, ultimately bought Fairchild for $122 million in 1987. Christine Winter, National Semiconductor to Buy Fairchild, CHICAGO TRIB. (Sept. 1, 1987),
§ 3, at 3.
112 Donna K. Walters & William C. Rempel, Trade War Victim: One-Time Winner is Out of Chips,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 1, 1987), at 5.
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shouted “Banzai” before smashing their planes into enemy warships.113 Four
decades after the end of World War II, Smith’s triumphalism displays discomfort, if not outright hostility, towards Japan. Since the U.S.T.R. participates in the CFIUS process, it is possible to impute Smith’s anti-Japanese
sentiment to CFIUS itself.
Another cabinet official viewed Fujitsu’s bid “as part of a master plan
of the Japanese to take over the U.S. information industry.”114 A degree of
caution seems warranted before imputing such positions to U.S. official policy. These positions are, however, indicative of strong anti-Japanese sentiment in the executive branch.
2. Congress Responds: Exon-Florio Amendments
This outpouring of anti-Japanese sentiment did not merely express negative stereotypes about Asians. It also had legislative consequences. The
Exon-Florio Amendment is the most significant development in U.S. international investment law since the establishment of CFIUS. In 1988, Congress
passed the Exon-Florio amendments to the Defense Production Act of 1950.
The newly revised law empowered the President to block foreign investments
that, in his estimation, threatened national security.115
According to its sponsors, Senator James Exon and Representative
James Florio, the law was a direct response to Fujitsu’s attempted acquisition
of Fairchild and was designed to bolster U.S. national security.116 However,
as we will explore below, the “national security” ramifications of foreign investment are often exaggerated, as they were here. Instead, anti-Asian sentiment animated opposition to foreign investment and generated support for
the Exon-Florio amendments in particular.117

113

Literally “10,000 years,” roughly equivalent to “Long live X” (in English) or “Viva X” (in Span-

ish).
114 William C. Rempel & Donna K.H. Walters, The Fairchild Deal: Trade War: When Chips Were
Down, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 30, 1987), at 2.
115 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2013).
116 See Jose E. Alvarez, Political Protectionism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 56 (1989). Senator Exon invoked both
the Fujitsu takeover and the failed takeover attempt of the Goodyear tire company by British investor,
James Goldsmith, in his remarks. See 100 CONG. REC. S8881 (1988) (statement of Sen. Exon). Representative Florio complained to his colleagues on the House floor that, during the Fujitsu “takeover,” the
“President found that he had very little authority to act. This provision will give the President important
powers to protect our national security.” See 100 CONG. REC. H8143 (1988) (statement of Rep. Florio).
117 Alvarez describes the animosity towards the Fujitsu acquisition in largely political terms. For example, he notes that industry observers compared the Fujitsu takeover to “selling Mount Vernon to the
redcoats.” See Alvarez, supra note 116, at 57. However, as we have seen, congressional opposition to the
deal frequently involved racist caricature and thinly veiled attacks on Japanese characteristics.
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C. The Third Asian Wave: The 2000s
By the turn of the millennium, after nearly a decade of economic stagnation, Japan was no longer viewed as a threat to U.S. prosperity. Two groups
from Asia took its place. After decades of economic growth, China represents
a potential threat to U.S. national interests. Additionally, “Arab” investment
has once again emerged as a source of tension.
1. Chinese Investment
Chinese investment has attracted an enormous amount of attention in
the past decade. Yet China, like the Middle East and Japan in the 1970s, remains a relatively minor source of U.S. foreign direct investment. Chinese
investment amounted to $2.42 billion in 2013, making it the fourteenth largest investor in the United States—after South Korea, Norway, and Mexico.118
That same year, China provided approximately 1% of the $236 billion dollars
of inbound investment.119
Despite its relatively small size, Chinese investment in certain sectors
has attracted a significant amount of attention. In 2005, the state-owned
China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) bid on Unocal, the U.S. oil
company. Congress’s reaction was swift and severe. Members of Congress
portrayed CNOOC’s potential acquisition as a threat to national security, 120
a challenge to market-based economics,121 and evidence of China’s “national
strategy of domination of energy markets and the Western Pacific.”122 Representative Duncan Hunter suggested the transaction would reduce U.S. leverage in the global war on terror because China would gain control of Unocal’s pipelines in Asia.123 In addition, Unocal—in conjunction with other
major oil companies—had worked closely with Central Asian governments
118 Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: 2014 Report, ORG. FOR INT’L INVESTMENT 5
(2014), http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/FDIUS2014.pdf. Norway’s economy is about one-twentieth
the size of China’s.
119 Id. at 3.
120 This was the topic of a three-hour congressional hearing before the House Armed Services Committee.
121 Forty-one members of Congress asked President Bush to stiff review the deal, citing increased
competition for U.S.-based companies in the global oil market, technology transfer implications, and Chinese subsidies to its domestic gas industry. Dennis K. Berman, Cnooc’s Unocal Bid Draws U.S. Legislators’ Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2005). Moreover, since CNOOC offered a higher price than Chevron
($67 per share, against Chevron’s $60), many skeptical commentators believed the deal amounted to a
rejection of market capitalism. Of course, it could have been that Unocal was worth more to CNOOC than
it was to Chevron. China’s appetite for natural resources in the 2000s was vast.
122 National Security Implications of the Possible Merger of the China National Off-shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) with Unocal Corporation: Hearing Before the Comm. On Armed Serv. H.R., 109th
Cong. 110–12 (2005) (statement of James Woolsey, former Director of C.I.A.).
123 Id. (statement of Rep. Duncan Hatcher, Chair, H. Armed Services Comm.) [hereinafter Hatcher
Statement].
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to develop a pipeline linking Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.124
Unocal withdrew from the consortium in 1998, but it had already spent years
negotiating with the Taliban by that time.125 It also had set up pipelines in
Burma.126 Both experiences, as well as potential U.S. government involvement in setting up these projects, would have raised national security concerns. Given the various risks associated with working in these areas, Unocal
may very well have partnered with U.S. government officials on such deals.
Some expressed concern about government ownership of a domestic oil
company.127 CNOOC Limited is 70% owned by the Chinese government,
while the remaining 30% of its shares are publicly traded on the New York
and Hong Kong stock exchanges.128 Others feared the Chinese government
would “lock up” Unocal’s oil supplies, keeping them out of U.S. hands.129
Outside Washington, DC, some expressed doubt about these concerns.
In an article entitled “Bogus fears send the Chinese packing,” the Economist
theorized that Unocal’s oil reserves were not large enough to jeopardize
world oil markets or disrupt U.S. access.130 Others characterized Congress’s
national security concerns as “disingenuous.”131
The CNOOC transaction was the first in a string of Chinese acquisitions
opposed by the federal government. Between 2008 and 2011, CFIUS blocked
three investments from the Chinese telecommunications company,
Huawei.132 In 2012, the House Intelligence Committee issued a report highlighting national security concerns about Huawei.133 Interestingly, the Committee’s report adduced no evidence of a national security threat, at least in
124

Paul Hueper, Energy investment a priority, PETROLEUM ECONOMIST (Dec. 2, 2002).
See Taleban in Texas for talk on gas pipeline, BBC (Dec. 4, 1997), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/world/west_asia/37021.stm.
126 See Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003) (alleging human rights violations in connection
with Unocal’s construction of a pipeline in Burma).
127 Hatcher Statement, supra note 123.
128 DICK K. NANTO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33093, CHINA AND THE CNOOC BID FOR
UNOCAL: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 7 (2006).
129 Brad Foss, Experts say national security threats not clear in CNOOC bid for Unocal, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (June 28, 2005) (quoting Richard D’Amato, chairman of U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission).
130 See Bogus fears send the Chinese packing, ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2005) http://www.economist.com/node/4244565.
131 William Pesek, Jr. No fury like a bidder scorned?, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Feb. 27, 2006). Pesek
describes racism in the European reaction to a proposed acquisition of French Arcelor by Mittal Steel—a
company based in Rotterdam and founded by Indian-born Lakshi Mittal.
132 See Scott M. Flicker & Dana M. Parsons, Huawei – CFIUS Redux: Now It Gets Interesting, PAUL
HASTINGS (Mar. 2011), https://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/1868.pdf (noting
CFIUS scuttled Huawei investments in 3Com in 2008, 2Wire and Motorola in 2010, and 3Leaf in 2011).
133 See H.R., PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei & ZTE (Oct. 8, 2012),
https://intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative
%20report%20(final).pdf (“Intelligence Report”). It is fairly unusual for a House committee to issue a
report that singles out a company (or two) in this way.
125
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the unclassified version made available to the public. In lieu of evidence, the
report cited Huawei’s evasiveness to questions posed by members of Congress.134 The report also conflated Huawei with China, as if all Chinese entities, even privately held ones, acted on behalf of the state.135 In sum, it repeated many of the mistakes of earlier interactions between the U.S.
government and Asian investors.
2. Arab Investment: Dubai Ports World
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, once again provoked antiArab sentiment in broad swathes of the United States. The twenty-one 9/11
hijackers hailed from Arab states, including allies such as Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.136 But that does not mean every Arab
person or investor represents a threat to U.S. national security. Still, many
people from the U.S. engage in racial profiling of anyone who appears “Middle Eastern, Arab or Muslim.”137
The animosity was displayed most prominently when Dubai Ports
World’s (“DPW”), owned by the Dubai sovereign wealth fund, proposed an
acquisition of the English port operator, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (“P&O”). At the time, DPW was one of the world’s largest
port operators, running sixty terminals on six continents.138 Had the investment gone through, DPW would have acquired one of the world’s oldest port
operators, as well as the ability to operate a very small number of terminals
in the United States.139

134 The first recommendation, for example, state that the “United States should view with suspicion
the continued penetration of the U.S. telecommunications market by Chinese telecommunications companies.” The sweeping nature of this statement, the failure to distinguish which Chinese companies pose
a threat, and the lack of evidence of Huawei’s wrongdoing pose major challenges to the report’s credibility. Id. at vi.
135 Huawei is a private company owned by its employees. Its founder, Ren Zhengfei, worked as an
engineer with the People’s Liberation Army in the 1980s. To be sure, its ownership structure is far from
transparent. But one cannot thus conclude that it operates exclusively at the behest of the Chinese government, or Chinese Communist Party. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015).
136 Fifteen came from Saudi Arabia, two from the United Arab Emirates, one from Egypt and one
from Lebanon. See CNN LIBRARY, September 11th Hijackers Fast Facts, CNN (last updated Sept. 5,
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11th-hijackers-fast-facts/.
137 Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2002) (describing five
types of racial profiling that led to the detention of over twelve hundred non-citizens). Id. at 1576.
138 See DP WORLD VANCOUVER, Who We Are, https://www.dpworld.ca/about-us/ (last visited Nov.
26, 2016).
139 Jonathan Weisman & Bradley Graham, Dubai Firm to Sell U.S. Port Operations, WASH. POST
(Mar.
10,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/09/AR
2006030901124.html.
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DPW submitted the transaction for CFIUS review in late 2005,140 enlisting the support of political operatives from both parties: former President
Bill Clinton, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright, and former Senate
majority leader Bob Dole.141 CFIUS approved the investment on January 17,
2006, provoking a congressional maelstrom that would ultimately scupper
the deal
Both on and off the floor, members of Congress used charged language
to derail the deal. Representative Barney Frank rebuked the Bush Administration for its “lapse in judgment” by approving the investment in the first
place.142 He stated:
Someone should have said to the people from Dubai that they are very
nice people with whom we have no particular quarrel, but they should
not take it personally if we explain to them that in the current context
in the world, having people from their part of the world controlling
shipping was likely to cause more trouble than it was worth . . . 143

Representative Frank used more genteel language than Senators Javits and
Metzenbaum did in the 1970s. But the assumption remains unchanged: Arabs
cannot be trusted. The trouble with Frank’s statement is that it engages, albeit
politely and discreetly, in racial profiling. It disqualifies an investor not on
its own merits—whether it can produce the good or deliver the service—but
due to its ethnicity.
Representative Duncan Hatcher also denounced the transaction, calling
Dubai “a bazaar for terrorist nations to receive prohibited components from
sources from the free world and the nonfree world.”144 Senator Frank Lautenberg invoked religious allegory, intoning, “[d]on’t let them tell you that it’s
just a transfer of title. Baloney. We wouldn’t transfer the title to the Devil;
we’re not going to transfer it to Dubai.”145 Such language uses new forms of
anti-Arab rhetoric (i.e. terrorism, religion) to dress up old antagonisms.146
140

Id.
Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Bill Clinton helped Dubai on ports deal, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2006),
https://www.ft.com/content/60414c4c-a95e-11da-a64b-0000779e2340; Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Role of Sen.
Dole’s Husband at Issue, WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/23/AR2006022301882.html; John Cranford, Defining ‘Ours’ in a New World, CQ
WEEKLY (Mar. 3, 2006).
142 One Year After Dubai Ports World, Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Serv., Comm. on Foreign
Inv. in the U.S. (CFIUS), 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of Rep. Barney Frank, Chair, H. Comm. on
Fin. Serv.).
143 Id.
144 National Security Implications of the Dubai Ports World Deal to Take Over Management of U.S.
Ports: Hearing before the H. Armed Serv. Comm., 109th Cong. 3 (2006).
145 Id.
146 Many scholars agree that Islamophobia constitutes a “new racism,” to be placed alongside previous
biological, cultural, and social constructions of race. See generally Nasar Meer and Tehseen Noorani, A
Sociological Comparison of Anti-Semitism and Anti-Muslim Sentiment in Britain, 56 SOC. REV. 195, 198
141
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In the end, Congress passed a bill prohibiting the acquisition of “any
leases, contracts, rights or other obligations of P&O Ports by Dubai Ports
World,” or “any other legal entity affiliated with or controlled by DPW.”147
DPW withdrew its bid the following day. Representative Jerry Lewis fired a
celebratory salvo, calling the annulment “a rifle shot crack to block the Dubai
Ports World deal only. This is a national issue. This is a national security bill.
We want to make sure that the security of our ports is in America’s
hands . . . .”148
Just two months earlier, CFIUS, under President George W. Bush, approved the transaction. While the Department of Homeland Security raised
objections about the sale to DPW,149 U.S. intelligence agencies found no “derogatory information” about DPW. DPW also agreed to cooperate with law
enforcement officials in the future, whereupon Homeland Security gave its
approval.150 It is unlikely that Homeland Security lacked salient information
about a major national security threat. But it is even more unlikely that a
member of Congress possessed information about a national security threat
that Homeland Security did not.
3. Congress Reacts: Foreign Investment & National Security Act of
2007
Congress responded to the Unocal and Dubai Ports World incidents by
passing the 2007 Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA). As
it did with Exon-Florio, Congress empowered the executive to scrutinize and
restrict foreign investments, this time by expansively defining national security.151 The concept now included critical technologies, critical infrastructure
(including energy assets), the “capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements, including the availability of human resources,
products, technologies, materials, supplies and services,” as well as other features.152
Members of Congress, just as they did with the Exon-Florio amendments, attributed the passage of FINSA to Asian investment. Senator Chris
Dodd observed the following during congressional hearings:
Concern within Congress about a transaction that would transfer control of terminal operations to a company owned by a Persian Gulf
(2008).
147 JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., RL33388, THE COMM. ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) (2016).
148 House Panel Votes to Block Ports Deal, FOX NEWS (Mar. 9, 2006).
149DHS Protested Port Takeover, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 26, 2006), http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,89396,00.html.
150 Id.
151 Defense Production Act of 1950, § 2170(b)(1)(D), (as amended 2007).
152 Defense Production Act of 1950, § 2170(f)(2), (as amended 2007).
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emirate through whose financial system funds had been transferred to
the terrorists who carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks upon the
United States, and that had been a central conduit for nuclear weapons
components being smuggled to hostile regimes, provided further impetus for review of the manner in which foreign transactions were being analyzed by CFIUS.153

Once again, Congress linked Dubai with terrorism. The concern was not
simply, as Representative Hunter suggested, that Dubai was a porous weapons entrepôt that armed hostile regimes. Senator Dodd suggested that banks
based in Dubai helped finance the 9/11 attacks. The implication being that
such transactions made the country a dangerous port operator. Banks in Britain, Canada, Germany, and the United States also helped finance the terrorist
attacks,154 but that did not disqualify port operators from these jurisdictions
from operating ports in the United States.
The differential treatment reserved for Arab investment did not go unnoticed. President George W. Bush asked, “Why all of a sudden a Middle
Eastern company is held to a different standard than a British one?”155 Likewise, General John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, said he
was “very dismayed by the emotional responses some people have put on the
table here in the United States that really comes down to Arab and Muslimbashing.”156 Still, the political response, and to some extent the public response, disfavored Arab and Asian investment.157 Even after four decades of
investment, United States officials still found reasons to reject or suspect capital flows from Asia. It is important to note that, at least as far as my research
shows, no official has publicly adduced a foreign investment that harmed
U.S. national security.

153 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, 153 CONG. REC. S8753 (daily ed. June 29,
2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2007-06-29/html/CREC-2007-0629-pt1-PgS8753.htm.
154 This list would include, at the very least, Standard Chartered, Western Union, Dresdner Bank
(Hamburg), First Union Bank (New Jersey), SunTrust Bank (Fort Lauderdale), Citibank, Bank of America
(San Diego), Union Bank of California, Royal Bank of Canada, National Commercial Bank (Saudi Arabia), Saudi British Bank (Saudi Arabia), UAE Exchange Centre (Dubai), Hudson United Bank (New Jersey), Dime Savings (New Jersey). See National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United
States, The Financing of the 9/11 Plot, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/
911_TerrFin_App.pdf. The Commission is an independent, bipartisan entity tasked with preparing “a full
and complete account of the circumstances surrounding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.” See
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, http://govinfo.library.
unt.edu/911/about/index.htm.
155 Lauren Etter, Dubai: Business Partner or Terrorist Hotbed?, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2006, at A9.
156 Holly Yeager & Edward Alden, Arab ally senses that Bush no longer has control in Washington,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at 8.
157 Id. (noting that members of Congress said they were “flooded with calls and letters from Americans angered by the deal”).
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III. POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-ASIAN SENTIMENT
Having outlined a series of decisions, statements, and policies that reflect anti-Asian sentiment, we now turn to a related inquiry. How should we
interpret them? Do they reflect simple racism? Political opportunism? A cautious reaction to national security threats? Anxiety about the wane of U.S.
power? The following two parts analyze a matrix of factors that underlie
these anti-Asian expressions. In this Part, we explore four common explanations of resistance to foreign investment frequently found in political science
literature. The goal is to determine if the repeated bouts of anti-Asian sentiment described in Part I should be understood merely as political expedients.
Or do they promote an Asia-phobic platform? Political explanations partially
explain resistance to Asia in certain contexts. But they do not discount the
possibility of other explanations of the anti-Asian sentiment described above.
A. Economic Nationalism
For the economic nationalist, “the main thrust of government is to protect the economic well-being of its citizenry,” even if that involves harming
other countries.158 As a set of policy prescriptions, economic nationalism typically aims to reduce imports, stimulate domestic production, and raise exports.159 On a macroeconomic level, this ensures a favorable balance of payments; a country will avoid trade deficits, maintain stable exchange rates, and
keep government spending in check. On a microeconomic level, economic
nationalism maximizes domestic employment, while keeping onshore both
high-technology goods and the facilities that produce such goods.160
Economic nationalism raises several issues with regards to foreign investment. Foreign investors act differently than local ones. They operate in
new environments without the deep knowledge, strong connections, and cultural embeddedness of local investors. Foreign investors often import more
raw materials or components from their home countries, dropping local suppliers.161 They may show less deference to local customs, or have little interest in the environment, labor practices, and surrounding communities.162 Finally, they may repatriate their profits back to their home countries, depriving
host countries of capital for jobs, investment, research and development, and
other uses.

158

EARL H. FRY, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 44 (1983).
Id.
160 Id.
161 Joel P. Trachtman, FDI and the right to regulate: Lessons from trade law, in The Development
Dimension of FDI: Policy- and Rule-Making Perspectives, 189, 192, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2003/4,
unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf.
162 Id.
159
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The economic nationalist casts a suspicious eye on any foreign investment. Yet the United States, to the extent it has an investment policy,163 has
largely eschewed economic nationalism. As described in Part I, the United
States has welcomed (most) foreign investment, and called on other states to
lower their barriers to foreign investment.164 To be sure, broad policy goals
need not constrain individual acts or statements. If a particular transaction
threatens the national interest, the government should step in to block the
deal.
The issue then becomes, how does blocking foreign investments advance U.S. economic interests? Let us examine a couple of the deals discussed above. Economic nationalism may partially explain resistance to Middle Eastern portfolio investment. It is possible that a foreign investor could
buy a sufficient number of shares to force a hostile takeover, as James Goldsmith attempted to do with Goodyear in the 1980s.165 But hostile takeovers
by foreign companies are exceedingly rare.166 Moreover, it is usually companies that engage in foreign hostile takeovers.167 As noted, Middle Eastern investors, whether individuals or government investors, sought primarily to diversify their portfolios.168 In no case did Middle Eastern investors attempt to
acquire a company, much less seek to tank companies in which they had
bought shares. Instead, fear of the unknown, buoyed by a widespread anxiety
about Arabs,169 prompted the resistance to portfolio investment.
What about the Fujitsu-Fairchild case? Certainly, economic nationalism
weighed on the minds of several federal officials. The Defense Department
worried that Fujitsu would refuse to sell microchips used in military systems
to U.S. computer makers.170 This would render U.S. companies excessively
163 Several writers opine that the United States until recently lacked a basic policy on inbound investment. See Robert T. Kudrle & Davis B. Bobrow, U.S. Policy Toward Foreign Direct Investment, 34
WORLD POL. 353, 364 (1982); ROBERT A. PASTOR, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN
ECONOMIC POLICY, 1929–1976, at 217 (1980) (“Until 1973, a host government investment policy was
something other governments had [but not the US]” . . . .).
164 See Mark Vallianatos, Multilateral Agreement on Investment: International flows of private investment have risen sharply in recent years, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, July 1, 1997, fpif.org/multilateral_agreement_on_investment (“Washington has long used diplomatic pressure, international advocacy,
and the leverage of bilateral and multilateral aid to encourage nations to deregulate foreign investment
(not to mention some sordid episodes of gunboat diplomacy and covert operations against governments
perceived as threatening large U.S. investors”).
165 For more on the hostile takeover, see infra, notes 266–67 and corresponding text.
166 According to a G.A.O. report, fewer than one percent of acquisitions involve foreign hostile takeover. In 1987, for instance, just over one-tenth of one percent (4 of 3,524) of acquisitions were foreign
hostile takeovers. Several years saw an even smaller percentage. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FOREIGN INVESTMENT: FOREIGN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS OF U.S. FIRMS, Dec. 1988, 6,
http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/88258.pdf.
167 Martin Tolchin, Hostile Bids By Foreigners On the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1988, at D1.
168 See supra, note 34.
169 See supra, note 25.
170 Sanger, supra note 104.
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reliant upon foreign suppliers for sophisticated electronics.171 Defense also
expressed concern about a domino effect; the acquisition of one U.S. semiconductor company would lead to the downfall of the entire U.S. chip industry, and extinguish U.S. productive capacities.172 The Commerce Department
likewise seized on the deal as a way to gain leverage over Japan, and compel
the Japanese government to reduce trade frictions in other sectors.173 In sum,
the transaction came to represent the larger U.S.–Japan trade imbalance. As
one senior U.S. official put it, “If Japan can come in and buy this company,
it can come in and buy them all over the place. We don’t want to see the
semiconductor industry under Japanese control.”174 Facing such a threat, the
U.S. government needed to “get tough” with Japan.
At the same time, contemporary analysts called the concerns of economic nationalism a “smokescreen.”175 First, the United States could still exert leverage over an entity owned by Fujitsu. The Defense Department had
many military contracts with Fairchild, and could have worked with other
suppliers if a Japanese-owned Fairchild failed to supply them.176 Second, if
military contracts were indeed a concern, CFIUS could have negotiated a
mitigation agreement to ensure that sensitive technologies remained in the
proper hands.177 If Fairchild produced sensitive military technology, that part
of the business could be split off and sold to a domestic company.178 With a
bit of negotiation, the government and the parties could likely have reached
an agreement.
Likewise, concerns that corporate Japan would come to dominate the
U.S. technology sector seem misplaced. Fairchild, by the mid-1980s, was
hemorrhaging hundreds of millions of dollars per year.179 Schlumberger
171

Id.
Peter T. Kilborn, 2 in Cabinet Fight Sale To Japanese: U.S. Bar Asked On Fujitsu Deal For Chip
Maker COMPANY NEWS Japan-Fairchild Deal Opposed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1987, at D1.
173 Sanger, supra note 104.
174 Kilborn, supra note 172.
175 Sanger, supra note 104.
176 Kilborn, supra note 172.
177 During the review process, CFIUS may negotiate a mitigation agreement to ensure that particularly
sensitive technologies remain in the proper hands. This can involve installing firewalls, requiring reporting obligations, and even selling off parts of the company to other domestic companies. Steptoe & Johnson, CFIUS Report: Significant Increase in Scuttled Deals, Jan. 8, 2014, www.steptoe.com/publications9273.html.
178 When Chinese company Wanxiang bought U.S. technology firm A123, Wanxiang agreed to sell
the sensitive military contracts to a third party U.S. firm. See Julie Wenrau, Navitas key to sale of A123
to Chinese firm, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2013, at 2.1.
179 See Daniel F. Cuff, Schlumberger Plans $485 Million Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1985, at D4
(noting that Fairchild’s parent company would take a $485 million charge against earnings from the troubled Fairchild division, which was expected to lose $140 million in 1985); Funding Universe, National
Semiconductor
Corporation
History,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/
national-semiconductor-corporation-history (noting that Fairchild lost a total of $265 million in 1985 and
1986).
172
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bought Fairchild in 1979 for $425 million, and planned to sell it, seven years
later, for $200 million. But for the U.S. government’s intervention, it probably would have. Ultimately, a U.S. company bought Fairchild for $122 million, a “steal” according to contemporary analysts.180 Schlumberger, the
French multinational that purchased the company without controversy in
1979, incurred a 70% loss on its seven-year investment.
The Fairchild deal did not reflect the state of the U.S. semiconductor
industry. According to current research, the United States produces 51% of
the world’s semiconductors, while Japan produces just 12%.181 In the end,
Fairchild lost the autonomy to select its business partner, a key feature of the
market economy.182 Government intervention ultimately decided the fate of
the transaction. Fairchild executives pursued Fujitsu specifically, believing
that company’s investment would strengthen Fairchild’s position in the
United States, and keep high-tech jobs there.183
Economic nationalism offers plausible reasons to oppose certain foreign
investments. On closer inspection, however, some of these concerns melt
away. A pure economic nationalist would oppose any foreign investment. A
less committed one might express concern about the fate of a particular domestic industry, and genuine fear that a foreign investment from a rival country might further imperil that industry. It is important to note that, at least in
the contexts described here, the domestic industry did not wither away, and
that, in retrospect, such concerns may have been exaggerated.
B. National Security
Government actors frequently oppose foreign investments on national
security grounds. In reality, few foreign investments pose credible threats to
national security.184 This incongruity should give us pause. As a former chairwoman of the U.S. International Trade Commission put it, “clothespin, peanut, pottery, shoe, pen, paper and pencil manufacturers have tried to justify

180 Victor Zonana, Schlumberger Will Sell Its Ailing Fairchild Unit: National Semiconductor Will Pay
$122 Million; Analysts Describe Deal for Chip Maker as a ‘Steal,’, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1987, at 1.
181 Falan Yinug, Made in America: The Facts about Semiconductor Manufacturing, SEMICONDUCTOR
IND.
ASSOC.
3
(2015),
http://www.semiconductors.org/
clientuploads/Industry%20
Statistics/FINAL%20Made%20in%20America%20white%20paper%20%2008192015%20as%20
posted.pdf.
182 William C. Rempel & Donna K.H. Walters, The Fairchild Deal: Trade War: When Chips Were
Down, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1987, at 2.
183 Kilborn, supra note 172.
184 See THEODORE H. MORAN, THREE THREATS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE CFIUS
PROCESS ix (2009) (positing that the vast majority of foreign investments pose no genuine national security risk).
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government protection by invoking national security.”185 One could add several other globally traded commodities—pork,186 oil,187 and steel188—that
members of Congress have recently dubbed national security threats in opposing individual transactions.189
Foreign investment threatens national security in three ways.190 First, a
foreign acquisition may render other U.S. companies, such as defense contractors, excessively reliant upon a foreign-owned entity. If the foreignowned entity delays or withholds certain goods, the contractor may be unable
to complete its task, potentially disrupting national security. Second, the foreign-owned entity could deploy its newly gained technology to harm U.S.
national interests. Third, the foreign-owned entity could use the acquisition
to surveil, infiltrate, or sabotage U.S. national interests.191 These issues are
addressed in turn.
Before one can credibly claim that a foreign investment poses a threat
to national security, certain conditions must be met. In the first scenario—
denial or delay to defense contractor supply chains—we must know how
readily available the particular good or technology is. Are substitutes easily
accessible? Could one find a new product or producer? Would it be costly?
If the foreign-invested entity denies the good or service, could U.S. entities
find the good elsewhere in the market? Semiconductors (Fujitsu), oil
(CNOOC), and capital (Middle Eastern portfolio investment) are not unique
commodities. Instead, they are largely interchangeable. If U.S. consumers
cannot buy gas at Unocal, they could do so at Shell, Texaco, Citgo, or other

185 Susan Liebeler & William H. Lash III, Exon-Florio: Harbinger of Economic Nationalism, CATO
REV. BUS. & GOV. 44, 49 (1993).
186 Marilyn Geewax, Can a Huge Hog Deal Pose a National Security Risk?, NPR, May 31, 2013
(noting opposition from Charles Grassley, Republican of Iowa, and Rosa DeLauro, Democrat of Connecticut); See also Nathan Halverson, Who’s behind the Chinese takeover of the world’s biggest pork producer, PBS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/whos-behind-chinese-takeover-worldsbiggest-pork-producer/ (noting comments from Senator Debbie Stabenow, Democrat of Michigan, who
described food as a strategic resource that should be as important to the U.S. government as oil).
187 See supra notes 120–26 and accompanying text.
188 See Wendy Leung et al., Anshan Steel Postpones U.S. Investment on Objection, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Aug. 19, 2010 (quoting Representative Tim Murphy as saying a Chinese acquisition of a U.S. steel
maker would both undermine the domestic steel market and pose “serious national security concerns”).
189 Given that pork, oil and steel are globally traded commodities, it is difficult to imagine how a
foreign acquisition of a domestic producer could seriously jeopardize their availability. Presumably, other
suppliers of the commodity exist, either inside or outside the United States. Even personal computers—
hardly a rare commodity—were thought to present national security concerns when a Chinese company
sought to buy IBM’s personal computer division. See Steve Lohr, Is I.B.M.’s Lenovo Proposal a National
Security Threat?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at C6 (describing a letter from three Members of Congress
to the Treasury Secretary seeking a review of the proposed transaction).
190 This analysis draws on Theodore Moran’s useful three-part schema to determine national security
threats from foreign acquisitions. See MORAN, supra note 184, at 19.
191 Id.
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stations. It is difficult to see how these investments, had they been consummated, would harm the national interest.
In the second scenario, the foreign entity uses its newly acquired technology or capacity to harm U.S. national interests. Citing the above examples, Fujitsu would produce Fairchild’s semiconductors, or CNOOC would
direct the flow of Unocal oil.192 Neither scenario would necessarily disrupt
or injure the U.S. economy, defense industry, or other national interest.
Moreover, how likely is this to happen? The answer hinges upon how advanced, and how widely known, the technologies are. If Fairchild manufactured a semiconductor that could not be easily reproduced, Fujitsu could then
use that technology against U.S. national interests. It could refuse to sell the
semiconductor to military contractors. This would pose a problem, though
not an insoluble one. Information about the product, including harmful uses,
emerges in the CFIUS review process. If evidence, as opposed to speculation,
shows that the technology harms national interests, CFIUS can (and often
does) negotiate a mitigation agreement.193 For example, it could require Fujitsu to sell off the militarily sensitive portions of Fairchild’s business.
The national security implications of the CNOOC acquisition likewise
require some probing. Taking congressional witnesses at their word,194
CNOOC would either deprive the United States of oil reserves or absorb sensitive seismic technologies. The threat of diminished oil access, as discussed,
seems highly improbable, both because oil is a globally traded commodity,
and because Unocal had a rather limited supply. Moreover, CFIUS could
have ordered Unocal to sell its seismic technology business to a third party.
Structured in this way, the transaction still would have denied the Chinese
government, CNOOC’s main shareholder, access to putatively sensitive technologies. Such a measured, evidence-based response would ensure proper
decision-making at the highest levels. It would guarantee that Chinese investors, like any other foreign investors, enjoy access to the U.S. market—something the United States is keen to accomplish in China and other places.195
That leaves the third threat: infiltration or sabotage by a foreign government. The Dubai Ports World acquisition, or an investment by Chinese technology firm Huawei, conceivably posed this type of threat. In Dubai Ports

192 During a congressional hearing, experts claimed that Unocal possessed seismic technology that
could measure underground nuclear test explosions. A congressional advisor warned that “China does not
have this technology, and it would be dangerous for them to obtain it.” Robert Collier, Backlash to Chinese
bid for Unocal/Bush urged to block takeover because of energy, security fears, SFGATE (June 24, 2005),
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Backlash-to-Chinese-bid-for-Unocal-Bush-urged-2626223.php.
193 One study suggests that, between 2009 and 2011, eight percent of all cases CFIUS reviewed used
legally binding mitigation agreements. Organization for International Investment, Understanding the
CFIUS Process, 3 (2013), http://www.ofii.org/sites/default/files/OFII_CFIUS_Primer.pdf.
194 Unocal denied that it possessed these sensitive seismic technologies. Collier, supra note 192.
195 Citing free trade and efficiency concerns, Exxon CEO Lee Raymond said it would be a “big mistake” for the United States to block CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal. Id.
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World, Congress feared an Arab-owned company would inadequately supervise U.S. ports.196 At the very least, it would provide less security than a British-owned company.197 How serious was the threat that DPW would sabotage
ports or otherwise compromise national security?
First, it is federal agencies, not private companies, that maintain the
safety of U.S. ports. Customs and Border Patrol performs this service by inspecting cargo that arrives into U.S. ports.198 Attaching responsibility for port
safety to the port operator is like attaching responsibility for airport security
to United or Delta. Moreover, no one in Congress adduced evidence of
DPW’s neglect in operating other ports around the world.
Second, CFIUS reviewed, and then authorized, the DPW transaction.
High-level officials from State, Defense, Treasury, Homeland Security, and
others testified before Congress that their respective department’s review had
been “rigorous,” “in-depth” and “comprehensive.”199 Even within a single
department, several agencies conducted independent reviews.200 CFIUS’s approval was not given casually. In addition, the Department of Homeland Security—as the agency responsible for port safety—negotiated an assurance
letter with DPW,201 requiring DPW to participate in ongoing anti-terrorism
initiatives, to enforce certain security protocols, and to provide law enforcement—without a subpoena—information on terminal operations, employees,
and security programs.202 Yet these extraordinary measures did not satisfy
Congress, which ultimately passed a law specifically prohibiting DPW’s acquisition.
196 It is important to note that the issue was not foreign ownership of a U.S. ports operator, as a British
company (P&O) then owned the ports. The issue was specifically about whether a Dubai-based company
should be trusted to operate ports in the United States.
197 David E. Sanger & Eric Lipton, Bush Would Veto Any Bill Halting Dubai Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 2006, at A1 (citing concerns of Bill Frist, Dennis Hastert, Charles Schumer, and Hilary Clinton).
198 The Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) “is responsible for
conducting immigration and customs inspections for aliens entering the United States at officials border
crossings . . . . CBP also is responsible for conducting customs-related inspections of cargo at ports of
entry and for ensuring that all goods entering the United States do so legally.” U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-375, HOMELAND SECURITY: PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TO ADDRESS
THE VULNERABILITIES EXPOSED BY 9/11, BUT CONTINUED FEDERAL ACTION IS NEEDED TO FURTHER
MITIGATE SECURITY RISKS 19 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/255650.pdf.
199 See generally National Security Implications of the Acquisition of Peninsular and Oriental Steamship Navigation Company by Dubai Ports World: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Armed Services,
109th Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 23, 2006 (containing statements by high-level officials from Defense, State,
Treasury, and Homeland Security) [hereinafter Dubai Hearings], http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg32744/html/CHRG-109shrg32744.htm.
200 See id. at 8 (statement of Gordon England, Dep. Sec. Def.) (noting the Army, Navy, Air Force,
Defense Security Service, Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, Transportation
Command and Defense Information Systems Agency).
201 See id. at 11 (statement of Robert Kimmitt, Dep. Sec. Treasury).
202 Id. at 14 (statement of Michael Jackson, Dep. Sec. Homeland Security). The letter also included
an enforcement mechanism that permitted DHS to seek remedies for false or misleading representations,
as well as omission of material information. Id.
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What about Huawei, the Chinese electronic and telecommunications
company with close ties to the Chinese Army? Security analysts were split
on whether Huawei investments would facilitate cyber-espionage or otherwise compromise U.S. national security.203 As one scholar put it, commentary “remained divided” between those who found a bona fide threat to national security, and those who succumbed to “anti-Chinese hysteria and
behind-the-scenes maneuvering by . . . U.S. competitors.”204 In at least this
case, then, foreign investment may have presented a national security risk. At
the very least, one cannot definitively rule out the possibility.205 Later, a report by the U.S. House Intelligence Committee underscored the potential
threat of Huawei acquisitions, though it presented no evidence of cyber-espionage to date.206 Given the underlying uncertainties surrounding technological infiltration and surveillance, one should approach the national security rationale cautiously. Better still would be concrete evidence of a national
security threat, particularly when a company—such as Huawei or Dubai
Ports World—operates in scores of other jurisdictions without reports of security breaches.
In sum, one can never fully exclude the possibility that a foreign investment will threaten national security. That does not mean, however, any
charge of a security threat can be taken at face value. Government actors
(among others) should specify the nature of the harm and consider ways to
avoid the potential threat. In the final analysis, the possibility that a foreign
investment would harm national security is ineradicable, but that does not
excuse government officials from articulating their concerns in a clear manner.

203

MORAN, supra note 184, at 28.
Id.
205 We now know, in the wake of revelations by Edward Snowden, that U.S. internet and technology
companies collaborated with the National Security Agency to insert entry points (or “back doors”) into
various products, which in turn allowed the U.S. government to spy on other governments. See Nicole
Perlroth, Jeff Larson & Scott Shane, N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic Safeguards of Privacy on Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2013, at A1. It is conceivable, then, that other governments may work with their own national
champions to do the same thing in the United States.
206 In 2012, the House Intelligence Committee released a very damning report about Huawei and ZTE
(another Chinese telecommunications company). The report uses very tough language to describe the
threat to national security that these two companies supposedly pose. Yet, in the publicly released version,
the report cites no evidence of spying by either Huawei or ZTE. Joseph Menn, White-House ordered
review found no evidence of Huawei spying, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-huawei-spying-idUSBRE89G1Q920121018. Instead, the report criticizes the companies’ refusals to cooperate with the confidential investigation, and to explain their relationships with the Chinese
government and Communist Party. U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies Huawei and ZTE, 112th Cong., Oct. 8, 2012, https://intelligence.house.gov/
sites/intelligence.house.gov/files/documents/Huawei-ZTE%20Investigative%20Report%20
(FINAL).pdf.
204
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C. RECIPROCITY
A third refrain emphasizes the lack of reciprocity207 between the United
States and various Asian countries.208 According to Curtis Milhaupt, the
“largest underlying cause of friction over Japanese FDI in the 1980s was the
perception that while the United States was open to Japanese investment and
imports, U.S. firms faced substantial barriers to trade in Japan.”209 The principle of reciprocity holds that Country A’s treatment of foreign investors
from Country B should be no better, or worse, than Country B’s treatment of
foreign investors from Country A.210 Specifically, if the U.S. government allows a Chinese company to invest in the U.S. technology sector, the Chinese
government should permit a U.S. company to invest in the Chinese technology sector.211
To be sure, reciprocity undergirds much of international investment law,
including many bilateral investment treaties. At the same time, the United
States has traditionally maintained an open investment environment—far
more open than many of its trading partners. To insist on reciprocity would
seriously challenge even traditional partners like Canada (which requires authorization for every foreign investment),212 France (which requires scrutiny
of investments in the fields of water, public health and transportation),213 and
207 This is also known as the principle of equality, most favored nation, or non-discrimination. While
these concepts have differences in nuance, they basically address the same issue: treating foreign investors
as favorably as domestic ones. See KRISTA NADAKAVUKAREN SCHEFER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW: TEXT, CASES & MATERIALS 13 (2013).
208 See, e.g., Reciprocal Trade and Investment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade of the
Comm. on Fin., Sen. Fin. Comm., 98th Cong. 1. (1983). The hearing discussed the Reciprocal Trade and
Investment Act, a bill to “ensure that U.S. exporters receive fair and equitable market access opportunities
in foreign markets . . . [by] negotiating mandates in the areas of trade in services, high technology products
and investment performance.” (statement of Sen. Danforth, Chair, Sen. Fin. Comm.). The bill was widely
seen as targeting “the contrived and unfair trade barriers in Japan.” Id. at 8 (statement of Sen. David Boren,
Member, Sen. Fin. Comm.).
209 Curtis Milhaupt, Lessons from Japan’s experience in the 1980s in INVESTING IN THE UNITED
STATES: IS THE U.S. READY FOR FDI FROM CHINA? 185, 193 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).
210 In this way, reciprocity resembles most favored nation status: the host country can treat foreign
investors no less favorably.
211 Take the case of 3com and Huawei. In 2003, the Chinese government approved the establishment
of a joint venture between the two companies. In 2008, 3com bought 49% share of Huawei. Later, when
Huawei tried to enter the U.S. market, CFIUS did not grant its approval, signaling it would block the
investment if it had gone forward.
212 Canada is one of the few countries to review and require approval for all foreign investments.
Canada also places greater restrictions on foreign equity ownership than similarly wealthy developed
countries. See Y. Beth Riley, Foreign Direct Investment Restrictions in Canada, 3–4 (March 2011),
https://www.bennettjones.com/Publications/Articles/Foreign_Direct_Investment_Restrictions_in_
Canada.
213 Fabrice Fages, François Mary & Bénédicte Bremond, Latham & Watkins Client Alert Commentary
No. 1688: New French Regulations Tighten Control on Foreign Investments (May 16, 2014),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/New-French-Regs-Tighten-Control-on-Foreign-Investments
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Germany (which extends preferential treatment to European investors, but
not U.S. investors or other non-Europeans).214 It would be counterproductive
to review inbound investment with reference to the home state’s investment
law.
Moreover, insisting on reciprocity would dilute the United States’
longstanding commitment to lowering investment barriers. If the United
States advocates merely for replicating the investment law of its trading partners, as reciprocity would require, the United States would forego much of
the work it has done on the multilateral level.215 It would also run counter to
the United States’ long-held policy on foreign investment.216 The idea of reciprocity may have intuitive appeal, but it would be nearly impossible to implement. In any event, it would set the United States back decades in its efforts to lower international obstacles to trade and investment. Reciprocity,
then, does not provide a sufficiently persuasive reason to oppose foreign investment.
D. Government Involvement
A final political explanation concerns the degree of government activity
in foreign investment decisions. Sovereign wealth funds, state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”), and “state-controlled” enterprises play an increasingly important role in international commerce and foreign investment.217 Undoubtedly, some of these investments have political goals, as opposed to the strict

(explaining how France screens foreign investment in a wide and growing array of sectors). Under a 2014
decree, the French Ministry of Economy expanded its investigatory remit from traditionally accepted strategic areas (national defense and information technology) to new areas such as energy, water, public
health, transport and telecommunications). Id.
214 Under a 2009 amendment to the Foreign Trade Act, Germany can block a non-European investor
from acquiring 25% or more of the voting rights in a German company. The regulation also applies to
European investors when there are “indications of an abusive or circumventory structuring that is intended
to undermine the control of the acquisition.” Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, New Restrictions on
foreign investments in Germany, 1, May 2009. In other words, Germany treats European investors more
favorably than U.S. investors, among other non-European, investors). This would clearly violate the most
favored nation clause of any Bilateral Investment Treaty.
215 See U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI): The Facts, Mar. 23, 1998 (“The MAI draft text reflects U.S. investment laws, regulations and practices. Its achievement will be in bringing other countries up to the standards the United
States already applies to all investors—domestic and foreign.”).
216 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2901(11)(A)(i), (ii) (explaining that “[t]he principal negotiating objective of
the United Sates regarding foreign direct investment are to reduce or to eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to foreign direct investment, to expand the principle of national treatment, and to reduce
unreasonable barriers to establishment; and to develop internationally agreed rules, including dispute settlement procedures. . . .”); Foreign Inv. in the U.S.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous.. and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong. (1974).
217 See generally Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed et al., Sovereign Investment: An Introduction, in
SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS (Karl P. Sauvant et al. eds., 2012).
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pursuit of profits.218 This need not, in itself, cause concern. As we saw above,
many Middle Eastern governments have used foreign investment to gain expertise, transmit knowledge and experience back to their home countries, and
develop various domestic industries (aviation, banking, telecommunications,
etc.). Nevertheless, there is a concern that the foreign government will deploy
the investment as a “Trojan Horse”; it would first infiltrate the United States,
gain a foothold here, and then harm the acquired company, domestic economy, or other national interest. In other words, national security remains the
paramount issue, particularly “in sensitive or strategic industries,” while lack
of transparency comes a close second.219
Anxiety over government involvement has informed discussions about
foreign investment for decades. In the 1970s, U.S. government officials expressed concern that the OPEC states, with their newfound wealth and “nouveau riche sensibilities,” would invest with “political purposes,” just as they
had curtailed oil exports for political reasons.220 And yet, contemporaneous
accounts from cabinet officials played down the threat of foreign-government investment. One State Department official opined, “Our experience has
been that foreign corporations with substantial government ownership have
generally responded to market forces when making investments in the United
States.”221 Moreover, just as with private enterprises, government investors
must obey the panoply of U.S. government laws and regulations. Even then,
some members of the U.S. government acknowledged that state-held capital
is not that different from privately held capital.
More recent surveys suggest that government investment strategies do
not differ significantly from institutional investor strategies.222 Recent studies
show that strategies of sovereign wealth funds and mutual funds largely converge: both seek financial gains regardless of the political regimes in which
they invest.223 Other studies show that sovereign wealth funds led by government officials invest more at home than when they are led by foreign managers.224 This weakens the link between politics and foreign investment because more “politicized” investors are less likely to invest abroad in the first
218

See id. at 11.
Id.
220 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
93rd Cong. (1974) (statement of Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson).
221 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
93rd Cong. (1974) (statement of William J. Casey, Under Sec’y of State for Econ. Affairs).
222 Jongbloed et al., supra note 217, at 14. The authors find that policy-makers’ concerns about political bias in strategic or sensitive industries are not well founded. The authors specifically cite Rep. Duncan
Hatch as an example of this unsubstantiated concern. Id.
223 Rolando Avendaño & Javier Santiso, Are Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments Politically Biased?
A Comparison With Mutual Funds, in SOVEREIGN INVESTMENT: CONCERNS AND POLICY REACTIONS
240–41 (Karl P. Sauvant et al. eds., 2012).
224 Shai Bernstein, Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, The Investment Strategies of Sovereign Wealth
Funds, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 219, 227 (2013).
219
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place. According to Paul Rose, sovereign wealth funds have largely sought
returns on the assets themselves, and “thus far have not made . . . investment[s] in the United States for strategic political purposes.”225
Congress has expressed alarm over Chinese investment and potential
government influence in cases where the investor is a government entity (like
CITIC or CNOOC) or has close ties to the government (Huawei). Members
of Congress have raised numerous concerns: the Chinese government could
gain access to sensitive technologies, spy on the U.S. military from nearby
installations, disrupt oil supplies, engage in cyber-espionage by manipulating
computer software, and so on. Yet, as explained above, few of these concerns
present national security threats. The purchase of a plane parts manufacturer
by a state-owned Chinese company may sound dangerous, but the parts themselves were neither sensitive nor used in classified applications.226 Likewise,
a Chinese state-owned enterprise’s bid for a U.S. oil company may indeed
threaten U.S. oil supplies, but oil is a globally traded, fungible commodity.
Even if the Chinese-invested enterprise diverted oil from the United States to
China, it would remain readily available on world commodity markets.
Moreover, recent scholarship suggests that Chinese SOEs, like sovereign wealth funds, act substantially similar to multinational corporations. 227
Since many SOEs are listed on stock exchanges, they are subject to market
disciplines and shareholder concerns. They must also abide by the regulations of the stock exchanges and the laws of host countries. If anything, Chinese SOEs are “still learning the rules of the road”: overpaying for certain
assets, treading clumsily into new environments, and ignoring local customs
of doing business.228 That does not necessarily make state-controlled or stateowned enterprises bigger threats to U.S. national interests than other multinational enterprises.
Finally, pursuant to the Foreign Investment and National Security Act
of 2007, any government-controlled entity investing in the United States—
whatever its purpose—undergoes a national security investigation.229 CFIUS
could annul the transaction, require that the capacity to produce sensitive
technologies remain in the United States, or devise a mitigation agreement to
account for the sensitive technology. Of course, foreign-controlled entities
must still obey laws on trade secrets, export controls, economic espionage,
and so on. In short, though the issue is frequently raised, investment by government-owned entities has thus far not harmed U.S. national interests in the
225

Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 87 (2008).
See Tom Brown, Mamco: Victim of China Anger? Firm May Have Been Target of Opportunity,
SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 6, 1990, at D1.
227 Wendy Dobson, China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Canada’s FDI Policy, UNIV. OF CALGARY
SCH. OF PUB. POLICY SPP RESEARCH PAPER, Mar. 2014, at 1, https://www.policyschool.ca/
wp-content/uploads/2016/03/chinas-soes-dobson.pdf.
228 Id. at 17.
229 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B).
226
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ways predicted.
One can never definitely rule out the possibility that a foreign-government investor might harm U.S. interests, but decades of experience should
make us wary of such speculation. Those who would challenge an investment
based on national security concerns should have the burden both to state specifically the nature of their concern, and to marshal evidence as to how the
investment would endanger national security.
In short, the above cited reasons do not fully account for the anti-Asian
sentiment directed at foreign investment. Economic nationalist concerns
sound plausible at first blush, but typically cannot withstand more exacting
scrutiny. Similarly, one cannot definitively say that a government-controlled
entity would never harm the national interest of the United States.
Still, after forty years, no conclusive evidence has yet emerged to support the claim that a foreign investment has endangered U.S. national security. Of course, this does not mean that no foreign investment could ever harm
U.S. national security or its national interests. Continued vigilance is warranted. But the absence of such an investment is significant. If political explanations cannot fully account for the periodic rashes of anti-Asian sentiment, what other possibilities are there?
IV. RACIAL EXPLANATIONS OF ANTI-ASIAN SENTIMENT
Contemporary racial discrimination takes various forms, from the violence of police shootings to the micro-aggressions of college campuses.230
This Part establishes a framework to understand anti-Asian discrimination by
drawing on racial discrimination jurisprudence, cultural theory, and critical
legal studies. It then reviews the statements and actions of government officials during the three waves of Asian investment to show the role that race
plays in both the construction of U.S. investment law, and in individual decisions regarding foreign investment.
Before proceeding with this analysis, however, two points require clarification. First, the United States has been neither monolithic nor uniform in
opposing Asian investment. Congress’s response to particular waves of
Asian investment correlates with the rising economic status of particular

230 Police shootings of unarmed African-American men have generated controversy, headlines and
debates around the United States since the August 2014 shooting of Michael Brown. See Monica Davey
& Mitch Smith, Justice Dept. Will Investigate Chicago Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2015, at A10. Psychologists define microaggressions as “brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral or environmental
indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory or negative racial
slights and insults to the target person or group.” See Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions in
Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM. PSYCH. 271, 273 (2007). See generally Brandon
Griggs, Do U.S. Colleges Have A Race Problem?, CNN (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/10/us/racism-college-campuses-protests-missouri (discussing racially
charged events on U.S. college campuses).
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countries. The rise of Middle Eastern economies in the 1970s, coupled with
the oil shocks, led to wide-scale animosity against investors from those countries. Similarly, the growth of the Japanese economy, and the trade imbalance
in particular, engendered fear and suspicion in the United States throughout
the 1980s.231 Since the Japanese bubble burst in 1990, however, the Japan
threat theory has largely abated. Currently, China’s economic rise dominates
headlines and stirs up anxiety of imminent U.S. demise.232 But the United
States still has a larger economy,233 richer per capita population,234 a more
dominant international currency (in fact, the globally dominant currency),235
and a stronger military.236 Some tensions in the U.S.–China relationship are
clearly warranted.237 But we must be careful that such anxieties do not influence decisions on investment policy, which may have little to do with the
underlying tension.
Second, investments from smaller Asian states—Taiwan, South Korea,
and Singapore, among others—have generated comparatively little controversy. It is not the case, then, that the United States rejects all Asian investment. Rather, only when the Asian state exerts a degree of geopolitical influence do U.S. officials perceive it as a threat to principles of the market
economy, U.S. primacy in world affairs, or the “American way of life.”238

231 Specifically, the “Arab threat” discourse of the 1970s coincided with the first signs of Arab economic influence in the United States (and the world). The opposition to Japanese investment reached its
peak during the zenith of Japan’s economic growth. And animosity towards Chinese investment has mirrored China’s own economic rise.
232 See Jeffery M. Jones, In U.S., Majority Still Names China as Top Economic Power, GALLUP ECON.
(Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/160724/majority-names-china-top-economic-power.aspx
(describing results of poll wherein 53% of U.S. citizens said China was the world’s largest economy,
while 32% correctly identified the Unites States). Using per capita gross domestic product (i.e., GDP
divided by population), the average U.S. citizen makes roughly ten times what the average Chinese citizen
makes.
233 The World Bank estimates that, in 2014, China’s economy ($10.36 trillion) was about 60% as large
as the United States’ ($17.42 trillion). See The World Bank, United States, www.worldbank.org/
en/country/unitedstates (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).
234 The average person in the United States annually earns $54,725, whereas the average Chinese
earns $7,437.
235 The International Monetary Fund’s recent decision to include the Chinese renminbi in its basket
of world currencies is certainly an important step in the internationalization of that currency. Yet there
can be no doubt that “the dollar still dominates in finance and trade . . . .” Keith Bradsher, I.M.F. Adds
China’s Currency to Elite Global Financial Club, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2015, at A1.
236 See David Axe, Why China is Far From Ready to Meet the U.S. on a Global Battlefront, REUTERS,
June 22, 2015, at A1.
237 Cyber-security, intellectual property theft, and China’s military buildup in the South China Seas
stand out as areas where U.S. and Chinese interests are visibly misaligned.
238 The threat to the “American way of life” is a common trope in congressional discussions. “From
Wall Street to Main Street, Americans are nervous about China’s effect on the American economy, American jobs, on the American way of life.” Hearing on U.S.–China Relations Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,
109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus). Baucus later served as United States Ambassador to
China under the second Obama administration.
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This geopolitical concern is not, however, free of racial or ethnic bias, for
why should we presume that investors from Asian countries seek to harm
U.S. national interests?
A. Analytical Framework
U.S. law recognizes two types of evidence of racial discrimination. The
first, direct evidence, takes place when an employer tells an applicant, “We
are not going to hire you because you are Asian.” But as the Supreme Court
has noted, “[o]utright admissions of impermissible racial motivation are infrequent and plaintiffs often must rely upon other evidence.”239 In prosecuting racial discrimination claims, plaintiffs frequently turn to the second type:
indirect or circumstantial evidence.240 This includes, inter alia, suspicious
timing of adverse actions, ambiguous statements made by superiors, systematically better treatment of persons outside of plaintiff’s protected group, and
other “bits and pieces of evidence” from which inferences of discriminatory
intent may be drawn.241 Circumstantial evidence thus comes in various forms,
from vague verbal assertions to better treatment of different ethnic groups.
For purposes of this framework, most evidence of racial discrimination
discussed falls into the second category, indirect evidence. Like most racial
discrimination lawsuits, this presents interpretive challenges. But the challenge is compounded by the fact that the U.S. government is not a single
person or entity. Rather, it is a composite organ of agencies, elected officials,
and appointed positions, employing thousands of people that change over
time, presidential administrations, and election cycles. Government bodies
themselves fluctuate; new agencies form while others dissolve or, more frequently, merge into existing ones. For these reasons, the proposed framework
does not adhere strictly to racial discrimination law, which targets discrimination by a single actor or set of actors. Instead, the primary purpose is to
show the discriminatory nature of various government actions and statements,242 as well as their harmful consequences.243
What, then, constitutes a racially discriminatory statement? Scholars of
cultural studies and critical legal studies have developed an expansive vocabulary to describe the images, techniques and discourses Western writers use
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Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
I am grateful to Andrew Pollis for this suggestion.
241 Abuelyaman v. Ill. State Univ., 667 F.3d 800, 809 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted).
242 In racial discrimination lawsuits, the defendant gets the opportunity to refute the evidence that he
acted in a discriminatory manner. Since the “federal government” is neither a discrete entity, nor a defendant in this exercise, we adopt the more modest goal of showing the actions and statements of its
representatives reflect racial bias.
243 Racial discrimination plaintiffs must also show that the discrimination constituted a “determinative
factor” in an “adverse action” against them. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 57 (1st Cir.
1999).
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to criticize, categorize, and control Asian subjects. The seminal text in revealing Western prejudices about Asia is Edward Said’s Orientalism. In describing centuries of Western thinking about Asia, Said posits four main principles or “dogmas”:
[1] One is the absolute and systematic difference between the West,
which is rational, developed, humane, superior, and the Orient, which
is aberrant, undeveloped, inferior. [2] Another dogma is that abstractions about the Orient . . . are always preferable to direct evidence
drawn from modern Oriental realities. [3] A third dogma is that the
Orient is eternal, uniform, and incapable of defining itself . . . . [4] A
fourth dogma is that the Orient is at bottom something either to be
feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or
to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright
occupation whenever possible).244

For Said, and many writing in his wake, Western observers adopt a baseline
of images, stereotypes, and conventions to view Asia.245 Said’s own work
focused primarily on European representations (literary, artistic, and philosophical) of Arabs during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These images portrayed Arabs as weak, passive, backward, irrational, and even prehistoric.246 More important, Said drew clear parallels between the historical
images of Arabs and U.S. government policy towards the Middle East.247
Thus, stereotyped views of Asians may exert influence on the formulation
and execution of U.S. foreign policy.248
But what about the rest of Asia? Can the concept of Orientalism cover
so broad a swath? Some would say “no.” China is different from Kuwait.
And the immense variety of languages, cultures, religions, and ethnicities
found in Asia simply defies an all-encompassing term like Orientalism.249
But many scholars would reply “yes.” Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha
have applied Said’s insights to reveal orientalist understandings of South
Asia.250 Scholars have also extended the Orientalist critique to Southeast
244

EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 300–01 (1978).
In this paper, I use the more current term Asian, instead of Oriental.
246 SAID, supra note 244, at 49 (“On the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there are
Arab-Orientals; the former are . . . rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, without natural suspicion; the latter are none of these things.”).
247 Id. at 47–49. Said cites articles written by U.S. State Department officials (including Henry Kissinger) that claim that citizens of developing countries experience “empirical reality” differently from
Westerners. Moreover, some of these articles claim “the art of subterfuge is highly developed in Arab
life.” Id.
248 See generally JOHN KUO WEI TCHEN & DYLAN YEATS, YELLOW PERIL! AN ARCHIVE OF ANTIASIAN FEAR (2014) (linking contemporary anti-Asian discourses to European colonialism and the enlightenment).
249 I thank Sharona Hoffman for this point.
250 Gayatri C. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
245
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Asia.251
With regards to Japan, the recourse to stereotypes, feelings of superiority, and the sense of an unbridgeable divide between East and West recur
regularly in Western conceptions of Japan. As David Morley and Kevin Robins write:
The West can never see Japan directly. . . . [The] Japanese were always destined to be seen through the fears and fantasies of Europeans
and Americans. Japan is the Orient, containing all the West most lacks
and everything it most fears. Against Japanese difference, the West
fortifies and defends what it sees as its superior culture and identity.
And so the West’s imaginary Japan works to consolidate old mystifications and stereotypes . . . .252

Orientalism also helps explain Western interactions with China. As
Teemu Ruskola shows, the West’s concern that China lacks law has had serious consequences for both the United States and China, including the
abridgement and violation of the rights of Chinese citizens and ChineseAmericans.253
Orientalism’s wide remit is not entirely surprising. Racial prejudice
rarely relies on analytic precision, scientific evidence, or geographical correctness.254 One does not usually form racist attitudes after calm and deliberate reflection, or extended experience alongside the other group. It has a material presence and rhetorical force, if not an internal consistency. Instead, as

CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988) (dissecting Western analyses of Indian
cultural practices, including sati); see generally HOMI K. BHABHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 96 (2004)
(showing how stereotyped views of colonial subjects helped articulate differences, and subsequently the
subordination, of Indians in the British imperial project).
251 See JUDY TZU-CHUN WU, RADICALS ON THE ROAD: INTERNATIONALISM, ORIENTALISM AND
FEMINISM DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (2013) (introducing a “radical Orientalism” practiced by U.S. activists during the Vietnam War); John Kleinen, Framing “the Other”. A critical review of Vietnam war
movies and their representation of Asians and Vietnamese, 1 ASIA EUR. J. 433 (2003) (critiquing Orientalist depictions of Vietnamese soldiers and citizens in U.S. and French films of the 1970s and 1980s);
Ananda Rajah, Orientalism, Commensurability, and the Construction of Identity: A Comment on the Notion of Lao Identity, 5 SOJOURN: J. SOC. ISSUES IN SE. ASIA 308, 310 (1990) (noting the influence of
French Orientalism on the conception of Lao national identity).
252 Id. at 168.
253 See TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED STATES, AND MODERN LAW 58
(2013); Timothy Webster, The Legal Precedents of American Orientalism, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 807, 812
(2014) (book review).
254 To be sure, scientists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries mobilized scientific methods
and concepts to investigate race. But their efforts, such as craniology, failed to propose a compelling
scientific basis for racial difference. See generally ELAZAR BARKAN, THE RETREAT OF SCIENTIFIC
RACISM: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF RACE IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES BETWEEN THE WORLD
WARS 2–4 (1992).
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Gerald Torres argues, racism is about domination, dehumanization, and differentiation.255 As Naoki Sakai has argued:
The Orient does not connote any internal commonality among the
names subsumed under it; it ranges from regions in the Middle East
to those in the Far East. One can hardly find anything religious, linguistic, or cultural that is common among these varied areas. . . . The
principle of its identity lies outside itself: . . . the Orient is that which
is excluded and objectified by the West in the service of its historical
progress.256

In other words, Orientalism says as much about our preoccupations with our
position in global affairs as it does about the empirical reality or shared commonality of any particular Asian country or people. It may lack a consistent
doctrinal basis, but it also provides a powerful set of images, stereotypes, and
discourses that can be mobilized to oppress, dominate, or persecute an illdefined group of people.257 U.S. officials generalize about Asians—whether
Arabs, Chinese, Japanese, or others—with surprising ease. This stands in direct contrast to the specific way in which they discuss investors from the
West.
Critical legal scholars have also applied Said’s basic insight to examine
the treatment of Asians and Asian-Americans in the U.S. legal system. Three
themes in particular resonate with the present inquiry. First, Asians and
Asian-Americans remain foreign. Even though the first waves of Asian immigrants came to the United States in the early to mid-19th century, long
before many Europeans passed through Ellis Island, Asian-Americans continue to be seen as outsiders—unknowable entities never fully incorporated
into the U.S. body politic.258 This ineradicable foreignness prevents Asians
and Asian-Americans from finding widespread acceptance within U.S. society.259
Second, by virtue of this “alienness,” Asians are frequently considered
255 See generally Gerald Torres, Introduction: Understanding Environmental Racism, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 839 (1992).
256 Naoki Sakai, Modernity and Its Critique: The Problem of Universalism and Particularism, in
POSTMODERNISM AND JAPAN 93, 117 (Masao Miyoshi & H.D. Harootunian eds., 1989) (emphasis added).
257 There is a similar flexibility with the term in “Latino” in this regard. In the U.S. context, “Latino”
can refer to people who have been in the United States for several generations, or just recently arrived.
Latinos may come from Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, Mexico
or many other countries. Of course, Orientalism covers a much broader territory (geographically, culturally, linguistically, ethnically), but the stereotyping impulse is the same. See Gene Demby, Poll Focuses
on Views from a Wide Array of Latino Americans, NAT’L PUB. RAD. (Jan. 21, 2014).
258 See generally Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” & Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War
II Propaganda, and Bifurcated Racial Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 18 (1996).
259 Natsu Taylor Saito, Alien and Non-Alien Alike: Citizenship, “Foreignness,” and Racial Hierarchy
in American Law, 76 OR. L. REV. 261, 296 (1997) (noting the “ongoing conflation of the domestic and
international” in contemporary discussions of Asian-American identity).
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threats to national security. From the Yellow Peril260 to Wen-Ho Lee,261
Asians incite mistrust among the U.S. public, media, and political classes that
is largely disproportionate to the threat they actually pose.262 The Korematsu
decision, where the Supreme Court upheld President Roosevelt’s order to intern 121,000 Japanese-Americans (including 70,000 citizens), reinforces the
view of Asians as disloyal to the United States, and allegiant to their home
countries.263
Third, because of the putative security threat, the rise of Asia is linked
to the decline of the United States. Here too, the Yellow Peril discourse is the
intellectual forebear. Consider the figure of Dr. Fu Manchu—the “yellow
peril incarnate in one man,” as his creator Sax Rohmer once described him.264
A staple of twentieth-century novels, films, comic books, and radio programs, Fu Manchu used his “Western intellect and Eastern cunning to try to
destroy Western Civilization and beat it at its own game of world conquest.”265 Fu Manchu may seem like an outdated embodiment of earlier racist
times. But contemporary politicians deploy similar language to oppose Asian
investment. Middle Eastern investors would buy stocks in U.S. companies
only to take control and crash them.266 Japanese companies would acquire,
and then devour or destroy, their U.S. competitors, especially in the technological fields.267 Chinese enterprises will lock up oil reserves in other parts
of the world, choke off U.S. supply, and replace the United States as world
hegemon.268
260

See generally TCHEN & YEATS, supra note 248.
Wen Ho Lee was a Taiwan-born physicist at Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory. He was accused of
espionage, fired from his job, indicted on fifty-nine counts of mishandling government information. He
was ultimately cleared on all counts, save one: mishandling computer files. See Neil Gotanda, Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000). Lee later
sued the U.S. government and several media organizations for violating his privacy rights; the terms of
their settlement agreement included payment of $1.6 million dollars to Dr. Lee. See JONES DAY, Jones
Day wins favorable settlement for Dr. Wen Ho Lee, http://www.jonesday.com/jones-day-wins-favorablesettlement-for-dr-wen-ho-lee-06-05-2006/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2016).
262 For example, Asians comprise 5.6% of the U.S. population, but make up only 1.2% of total arrests.
Likewise, they are charged with committing 1.2% of its crimes. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012 (2012), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/tables/43tabledatadecoverviewpdf.
263 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Korematsu often ranks alongside
Dred Scott and Plessy as the worst Supreme Court decisions of all times. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 (2011) (surveying the “weak constitutional analysis” of four Supreme
Court decisions, including Korematsu); Carol J. Williams, Legal scholars examine the U.S. high court’s
‘Supreme Mistakes,’ L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2011 (describing a Pepperdine Law School conference—featuring Professors Akhil Amar, Erwin Chemerinsky, Daniel Farber, and others—reviewing the worst Supreme
Court decisions).
264 SAX ROHMER, THE INSIDIOUS DR. FU-MANCHU 26 (1913).
265 TCHEN & YEATS, supra note 248, at 5.
266 See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 92–100 and accompanying text.
268 See supra notes 120–129 and accompanying text.
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B. Middle Eastern Investment
Congress’s reaction to Middle Eastern investment in the 1970s instigated the first U.S. laws and regulations on international investment. Senators Jacob Javits and Howard Metzenbaum raised numerous concerns about
investment from the Middle East. Specifically, they complained of Arab
“technological backwardness,” “nouveau riche” sensibilities, and “reckless
disregard for public responsibility.” It is not simply the derogatory content of
these remarks. The broader issue is the failure to investigate the motivations
of “Arab investors” before attempting to restrict their access to the United
States. To paraphrase Said, abstract caricature was preferred to direct evidence of the danger posed by these investors.
These two senators, among others, introduced bills to restrict, limit, or
require public disclosure of foreign investments.269 No bill mentioned Asian
investment by name, yet they responded to the infusion of Middle Eastern
portfolio investment.270 In the end, only one of the proposed bills that sought
to “collect limited amounts of information” on foreign investment became
law.271 One might argue, then, that there was no “action,” just a lot of acrimonious speech. Yet congressional pressure spurred President Ford into establishing CFIUS. But for Congress, the Ford Administration would probably not have created CFIUS. The Committee was born in a moment of
congressional hostility toward Middle Eastern investment.272
Middle Eastern investors themselves noted the government’s condemnatory attitude.273 In private meetings with U.S. officials, Saudi investors reportedly reassured their counterparts that they did not seek to take over or
destroy U.S. companies.274 As one Saudi petroleum official noted, perhaps
with an oblique nod to the former ownership of Saudi natural resources by

269 Peter Milius, Arabs Investing Cautiously: Feared Intrusions into U.S. Economy Not Developing,
WASH. POST, June 1, 1975, at 2.
270 Jack Egan, Administration Fights Limits for Foreign Investments, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1975 (“The
Foreign Investment Act of 1975 . . . is basically aimed at investment by Middle East oil producers . . . .”).
Edward Cowan, U.S.-Saudi Talks To Open This Week: Washington Is Hopeful as a Variety of Economic
Accords Are Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1975, at 5 (noting that the bilateral talks would include discussion of “Washington’s indecision about limits on foreign investment in the United States, especially
investment by Arab countries and Iran”).
271 See International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3108 (1976).
272 See, e.g., PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITMAN, Outline of Legal Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions in the United States 81 (2003), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/MandA_
reprint_814.pdf (“[CFIUS] is an interagency body established by Executive Order in 1975 in response to
concerns at the time about Arab investment in the United States.”).
273 Edward Cowan, Saudi is Lobbying in U.S. Against Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1975, at 3. The
irony is that Saudi Aramco, presently Saudi Arabia’s largest producer of oil, started out as a U.S. company.
Later, in the 1970s, the kingdom came to acquire the entire company, thus regaining control over its
natural resources.
274 Id.
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U.S. companies,275 “We don’t have in mind any idea of control of your natural resources.”276
Gulf state investors met with government officials to learn which industries were closed to foreign investment. Saudi officials in particular used informal consultations before making major investments, suggesting the anxiety both sides felt about U.S. popular reaction to Saudi investment. It is
unclear if the congressional reaction diminished Saudi investment.277
C. Japanese Investment
Negative reactions to Japanese investment in the 1980s likewise drew
on old and inaccurate images of Japan. Looking at the totality of the evidence,
racism probably played an even more prominent role than it did in the reaction to Middle Eastern investment in the 1970s. With Japan, it was not simply
a small number of Senators who expressed concern, but a diverse array of
members of Congress.
In opposing Japanese investment, members of Congress hewed closely
the Orientalist discourse explicated by Said. According to Representative
Pete Stark, the Japanese were:
A people (some have used the word clan) who have lived by themselves on a set of islands for nearly 2,000 years of recorded time do
not readily buy from outsiders. There is no GATT, there is no law,
there is no treaty, there is no negotiation that is going to change that.278

This recalls the Orientalist technique of portraying Asians as timeless, eternal, and unchanging—a pre-rational and pre-modern foil to the West. Similarly, Senator Pete Wilson called Japan a “drug addict,” hooked on “predatory trade practices,” and incapable of reforming itself.279 This too draws on
Orientalist tropes, and perhaps even confuses Japan with China, which had
an opium epidemic in the early nineteenth century.280
More problematic is the latent “legal orientalism” lurking in these statements. Teemu Ruskola has defined “legal orientalism” as a set of discursive

275 Standard Oil signed its first oil concession agreement with the Saudi government in 1933. The
Saudi government took a 25% share in 1973, and through incremental payments, purchased the entire
entity by 1980. See Saudi Aramco, History: Milestones, http://www.saudiaramco.com/en/home/
about/history/1980s.html.
276 Cowan, supra note 273.
277 One Saudi official did, however, note that Saudi would decrease its investment in the United States,
but did not specify the reason. See Douglas W. Cray, People and Business: Saudis to Limit U.S. Investing,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1975, at 40.
278 131 CONG. REC. E1431 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1985).
279 135 CONG. REC. S6399 (daily ed. June 8, 1989).
280 Peter C. Perdue, The First Opium War: The Anglo-Chinese War of 1839-1842, MIT Visualizing
Cultures, http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/opium_wars_01/ow1_essay01.html.
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practices that Western commentators use to determine “what is and is not
law, and who are and are not its proper subjects” in various Asian jurisdictions.281 Ruskola’s critique focuses mainly on Western characterizations of
Chinese “lawlessness.” But his critique applies with equal force to U.S. conceptions of Japan. Stark’s depiction of a timeless Japan—isolated from the
rest of the world, impervious to change, with a blatant disregard for international law—misrepresents Japanese notions of legality and the importance of
international law in Japan.
The Fujitsu-Fairchild transaction also reflects this differential treatment.
When Schlumberger bought Fairchild in 1979, no one objected that a French
company was purchasing a U.S. icon.282 But when a Japanese company bid
on the same company, the U.S. government balked. In either case, the investor was foreign. But the U.S. government opposed Asian ownership. Why?
The officially stated reason was “national security.”283 It is true that Fairchild
had a small number of contracts with the U.S. military.284 But had those contracts been for sensitive technologies, the Defense Department could have
easily denied those contracts to the Fujitsu-owned entity.285 Moreover, it is
unlikely that Japan, a close political and military ally, would forbid its companies from selling semiconductors to the United States.286 Indeed, given the
broader context of the U.S.–Japan military alliance, the fate of a failing semiconductor company would probably not jeopardize U.S. national security.287
A secondary reason was probably economic nationalism. Japanese companies were outperforming their U.S. rivals, leading some to believe they would
decimate the U.S. semiconductor industry. Why, then, “offer up” a U.S. company to a Japanese competitor? This has some explanatory purchase, but still
seems inadequate to explain the government’s strong negative reaction.
Because the differential treatment of European investment forms a core
part of this Article’s thesis, we reflect upon it for a moment. Congress has, to
be sure, vocally opposed European investments over the past forty years. To

281 TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM 5 (2013). See also Timothy Webster, The Legal Precedents of American Orientalism, 62 AM. J COMP. L. 1003 (2014) (reviewing TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL
ORIENTALISM).
282 The Washington Post dispassionately reported that “Fairchild . . . has announced it has agreed to
be taken over by Schlumberger, which has offered $363 million in cash, or $66 dollars a share, for all of
Fairchild’s outstanding shares. The bid was accepted at a meeting of the Fairchild board on Saturday.”
Fairchild, Schlumberger Plan Merger, WASH. POST, May 22, 1979, at E4.
283 Sanger, supra note 104.
284 Id.
285 Id.
286 KENNETH FLAMM, MISMANAGED TRADE?: STRATEGIC POLICY & THE SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY 373 (1996).
287 The United States currently deploys 54,000 U.S. troops in Japan, and has actively participated in
Japan’s national security since the end of World War II. Hannah Beech, The Tense Relationship between
Japan and the U.S. Military, TIME, June 8, 2016.
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take one roughly contemporaneous example to the Fujitsu controversy, Congress resisted the hostile takeover of Goodyear Tires by British investor
James Goldsmith. In articulating their opposition, members of Congress did
not view the takeover as part of a larger British conspiracy to re-colonize the
United States, even though the United States was formerly a British colony.
Nor did they critique the transaction based on English “national character.”
Instead, the discussion focused on objections to the particular investor.288
Even when exchanges became heated,289 members of Congress focused on
the merits of the investment, and not the investor’s nationality.
With Japan and other Asian investments, by contrast, Congress asked a
different set of questions. The Japanese were depicted as hostile, alien, and
intent to destroy the United States. Members of Congress talked about “the
Japanese,” but rarely about the company, Fujitsu. They did not view Fujitsu’s
proposed acquisition as the consequence of independent analysis of its longterm interests or strategy. Instead, Fujitsu was an appendage of the Japanese
state, submerged into the “vast, faceless, nameless yellow horde,” as John
Dower has written.290 Congress thus drew upon the “yellow peril” discourse
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, portraying Asians as collectively-minded and incapable of acting on their own initiative. It also resorted to the Orientalist technique of appealing to abstraction and stereotype,
as opposed to direct evidence of what this company hoped to achieve.
Adverse actions followed. Under pressure from the Reagan Administration, Fujitsu withdrew its bid for Fairchild.291 Administration officials did not
shy away from expressing anti-Japanese sentiments, including the reaction
of Deputy United States Trade Representative Mike Smith, described

288 When English investor James Goldsmith sought a hostile takeover of Goodyear tires in 1986, Congress focused on U.S. securities laws, the long-term interests of Goodyear’s shareholders and employees,
and the implications for the U.S. economy. Even when congressional testimony turned acrimonious, as it
did, the focus was on “corporate raiders,” not on the perils of English capitalism. See Stuart Warner, 25
Years Ago: Driving back the raider at the gates of Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., CLEVELAND.COM,
Nov. 27, 2011; Robert D. Hershey Jr., Goodyear and Sir James Square Off, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1986,
at D1. Likewise, when the French company Thomson-CSF bid for a U.S.-based missile manufacturer,
members of Congress opposed the transaction by seizing on national security concerns, partial ownership
of the company by the French government, and allegations that the company’s alleged violation of U.S.
export laws by selling lasers to Iraq. See French Firm Drops Its Bid for LTV Missile Unit, ASSOC. PRESS,
July 7, 1992.
289 For example, Congressman John Seiberling, whose grandfather founded Goodyear, denounced the
takeover by Englishman James Goldsmith. In congressional testimony, Seiberling called the proposed
acquisition an “assault . . . by the financial community,” and demanded of Goldsmith “Who the hell are
you?” Mark Potts, Goldsmith Trades Barbs with Critics at Hearing, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 1986. Goldsmith’s English nationality, however, was never taken up as an issue to halt the investment. Id.
290 John W. Dower, Yellow, Red, and Black Men, in THE IMPACT OF RACE ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
A READER 194, 198 (Michael L. Kreen ed., 1999).
291 Sanger, supra note 104.
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above.292 Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige called the acquisition “really bad policy.”293 He also recalled unspecified national security concerns
that Fairchild executives had tried to debunk.294
The Fujitsu incident also altered the legal framework for foreign investment in the United States. Both Senator Exon and Congressman Florio, who
sponsored the Exon-Florio amendment, cited the Fujitsu transaction as the
primary reason to empower the President to block inbound investments.295
Congressman Florio specifically linked the Fujitsu takeover with the need to
protect “national security.”296 But as noted above,297 the shibboleth of national security cannot be accepted at face value. Instead, residual concerns
about a powerful Japan seemed to persuade most government officials to oppose the Fujitsu transaction, and Japanese investment more broadly.
D. Chinese Investment
Investment from China generated considerable controversy in the 2000s
and 2010s. Since CNOOC’s unsuccessful bid for Unocal in 2005, Chinese
investors, private and state-owned, have encountered hostility from both
Congress and the Cabinet. In articulating their suspicions, U.S. government
actors largely eschew the racist caricatures of both Middle Eastern investors
in the 1970s, and Japanese investors in the 1980s. This development probably
reflects greater cultural sensitivity. Instead, they criticize the “government of
China,” “communist China” or even “Red China.”298 Of course, Orientalist
thinking may very well undergird the more anodyne language.
Yet even before the CNOOC incident, Chinese investment prompted
concern about “national security.” In 1990, George H.W. Bush used his enhanced presidential powers under the Exon-Florio amendment to block a
Chinese investment. He cited “credible evidence” that the Chinese stateowned company “might take action that threatens to impair the national security of the United States.”299 But he did not specify what that evidence was.
In a letter to Congress, President Bush wrote that the U.S. manufacturer sold
most of its goods to “a single manufacturer for production of civilian aircraft.
Some of its machinery is subject to U.S. export controls. It has no contracts

292

See supra notes 112–13, and accompanying text.
Kilborn, supra note 172 (quoting an official from the Japanese Embassy who called Secretary
Baldrige’s views “illogical”).
294 Id.
295 See 134 CONG. REC. S4833 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Exon); 134 CONG. REC.
H2278 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep. Florio).
296 Id.
297 See supra notes 202–06, and accompanying text.
298 See supra notes 117–20, and accompanying text.
299 See Order Pursuant to Section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, 55 Fed. Reg. 3935 (Feb.
1, 1990) (emphasis added). The statement itself constitutes a fairly weak assessment of the security threat.
293
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with the United States Government involving classified information.”300 In
other words, MAMCO did not produce sensitive military technology. The
fact that certain products were subject to export controls should not have sunk
the deal, as these controls would have prohibited their exportation to China.
At the time, MAMCO did not actually export anything.301 Many commentators doubted the national security implications of the investment.302 A more
likely explanation would pair a longstanding fear of China with a persistent
antagonism towards government investment in the United States.
More recently, when CNOOC launched its bid for Unocal, a congressional chorus homed in on the national security implications of the deal.303
Two members of Congress decried “China’s aggressive tactics to lock up
energy supplies around the world that are largely dedicated for their own
use.”304 James Woolsey testified to the House Armed Services Committee
that CNOOC is “an organ, effectively, of the world’s largest communist dictatorship,” and that its proposed acquisition was part of China’s “national
strategy of domination of the energy markets and strategic domination of the
western Pacific.”305
Several questions arise from this testimony. First, it is unlikely that Unocal’s sale would appreciably disrupt oil supplies. Unocal had proven reserves of 1.754 billion barrels of oil,306 out of a world total of 1.292 trillion
barrels (about 0.0013%).307 Nor was it a major player in the United States
(ranking tenth).308 Oil is a commodity bought and sold on world markets. It
is unlikely that changing ownership of such a small percentage of the world
oil supply could disrupt global markets or U.S. access to oil. Oil as a “national
security” threat thus appears unlikely.
300

138 CONG. REC. 761, 05 (1990) (statement of President George H.W. Bush).
See Harriet King, China Ends Silence on Deal U.S. Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at D1
(quoting officials from the Chinese government and the CEO of MAMCO).
302 Officials in both the Chinese government and the U.S. manufacturer expressed doubts that
MAMCO’s products could threaten U.S. national security. See id.; Art Pine & James Gerstenzang, China
Must Sell U.S. Aircraft Parts Maker, Bush Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, at D1 (noting “mixed reviews”
among international lawyers). Possible reasons also include (a) denying CATIC (the Chinese aeronautic
agency) a position in Seattle to conduct its operations; (b) concern after CATIC allegedly disassembled a
GE jet engine and stole advanced technology several years before; (c) punishing China for failing to
change the repressive atmosphere after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989; (d) securing a political deal with
the Senate on a bill to allow Chinese students in the US to extend their visas. See Brown, supra note 226.
303 See Paul Blustein, Many Oil Experts Unconcerned over China Unocal Bid, WASH. POST, July 1,
2005, at D1.
304 Two Texan congressmen wrote this in a June 27, 2005 letter to President George W. Bush. Id.
305 See EDWARD S. STEINFELD, PLAYING OUR GAME: WHY CHINA’S RISE DOESN’T THREATEN THE
WEST 178 (2011).
306 See ChevronTexaco to Purchase Unocal for $16.4 Billion, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 4, 2005.
307 See Global Reserves, Oil Production Show Small Increases for 2005, OIL & GAS RESERVES, Dec.
19, 2005, at 73.
308 PIW’s Top 50: How the Firms Stack Up, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Dec. 12, 2005, at
16.
301
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Instead, one could imagine that the transaction might threaten a broader
set of U.S. interests. As described above, Unocal had worked with a host of
unsavory governments around the world. The United States, whether or not
it helped Unocal do business in these areas, may not have wanted this information ending up in the hands of the Chinese government. The issue may fit
more neatly into a national interest rubric. Yet as James Feinerman and others
have written,309 CNOOC was a pretty small transaction, the blockage of
which represented a “protectionist, xenophobic or maybe even racist reaction.”310
More recently, the U.S. government claimed that Ralls and Huawei’s
attempted acquisitions would impair national security. In Ralls, the D.C. Circuit found that President Obama failed to give Ralls the opportunity to view
or respond to unclassified information, and thus violated its due process
rights.311 Why did the President force Ralls to divest? We do not know. But
some suggest presidential suspicion that Ralls might spy on drones, which
the Navy was developing nearby.312 Such concerns suggest that Ralls, a privately held company established in Delaware by two Chinese nationals,
would spy on behalf of the Chinese government.
As with Japan and Fujitsu, it is wise to separate private companies from
home governments. The conflation of corporation and country is more plausible with a state-owned or state-controlled entity. But even these enterprises
do not act so differently from most commercial actors.313 Ralls, on the other
hand, is a privately-held corporation producing wind turbines. If the wind
turbines were located too close to a U.S. Naval Base, when exactly did that
309 See Seven Questions: China and Unocal, FOREIGN. POL’Y (July 1, 2005), http://foreignpolicy.com/2005/07/01/seven-questions-china-and-unocal/. Other analyses that posited race or xenophobia
include (1) Christopher Herman, Cnooc-Nexen Deal Is Just the Beginning of the Great American Oil Gas
Grab,
FORBES
(July
23,
2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/
christopherhelman/2012/07/23/why-cnoocs-19-5-billion-offer-for-nexen-is-a-done-deal/#1c1a97ea4e5b
(noting the “xenophobic American politicians who blocked [CNOOC’s] 2005 takeover of Unocal”); (2)
Op-ed: Let Chinese Buy Unocal; It Won’t Hurt Our Oil Supply, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 12, 2005 (“In
fact, the Unocal controversy seems like scaremongering of the worst kind with racist ‘yellow peril’ overtones. Would there be such an uproar if the buyers were Russian or French or Saudi Arabian?”); and (3)
Sheila McNulty, Rants and racism fill the blog sites, FIN. TIMES (July 6, 2005), http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/3366413c-edbb-11d9-9ff5-00000e2511c8.html?ft_site=falcon&desktop=true#axzz4PYGBck4P
(“A series of blog webpages set up by individuals to publish the typical blogging mix of fact, opinion and
raw prejudice, plus any responses, have turned to the issue for a debate.”).
310 See Seven Questions: China and Unocal, supra note 309.
311 See Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “[D]ue process
requires, at the least, that an affected party be informed of the official action, be given access to the unclassified evidence on which the official actor relied, and be afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.” Id. at 319.
312Helene Cooper, Obama Orders Chinese Company to End Investment at Sites Near Drone Base,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2012, at A16; Julie Pace, Obama blocks Chinese purchase of U.S. wind farms,
WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-blocks-chinese-purchase-of-us-wind-farms/2012/09/28/e1cd8246-09bd-11e2-a10c-fa5a255a9258_story.html.
313 See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 135.
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become a problem? The Chinese investors purchased the wind-farm from a
Greek company, who bought it without causing a major contretemps.314 As
far as we know, the U.S. government did not oppose the sale of the same
wind-farm to the Greek company. Yet it strongly opposed the transfer to a
privately held Asian company. We do not know the exact reason, and the
government is under no obligation to tell the general public, or the company
itself.
In the lawsuit, Ralls did not bring a racial discrimination claim, so the
D.C. Circuit did not rule on this issue. The court did, however, note “other
foreign-owned windfarms using foreign-made wind turbines operate without
governmental interference near the same restricted airspace as the Butter
Creek projects. We can thus infer . . . mere proximity of [the windfarms] to
the restricted air space is not the only factor that precipitated the CFIUS Order.”315
The court, rightly, does not engage in speculation. But we might wonder
what other factors might have led the Obama Administration to make its decision. Competition in the renewable energy sector? Fear of Asian investment? Some combination thereof? In the absence of a public explanation,
suspicions arise on both sides of the Pacific.
E. Dubai Ports World
The evidence of discrimination against Dubai Ports World recalls prior
discussions of “Arab” investment: derogatory statements based on ethnicity,
and differential treatment of Arabs and non-Arabs. We have reviewed the
colorful language members of Congress used to describe a longstanding U.S.
ally in the Middle East: the devil, a bazaar for terrorist nations, and so on.
Even the more genteel locutions of Barney Frank rehashed quintessential stereotypes about Arabs:316 people from that “part of the world” cannot be
trusted to run U.S. ports.317
Congressman Frank and his fellow members of Congress said nothing
about DPW’s track record in running ports around the world, or the strategic
implications for either DPW, or the British company they sought to buy. Instead, Congress resorted to stereotyped fallacies about “Arabs.” It also
treated DPW differently from European counterparts. The company that
DPW sought to purchase—P&O—was British. No one objected when a European owner operated U.S. ports. But when the foreign owner was Arab,
314

Ralls purchased the wind farm project from Greek company TernaUS. See Ralls, 758 F.3d 301, at

n.5.
315

Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
Stereotypes are rigid and exaggerated beliefs about an entire category of people, and each individual within the group. They often form the basis for discriminatory attitudes and actions. See ALI
RATTANSI, RACISM: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 126–30 (2012).
317 See supra note 142.
316
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“national security” suddenly emerged as a critical issue. Indeed, most U.S.
ports are operated or owned by foreign entities, part of a global trend towards
consolidation in the shipping industry.318 In the case at hand, P&O operated
24 terminals, out of the 829 available, in six U.S. ports. No publicly available
evidence indicates DPW suffered security lapses at other ports. The differential treatment did not elude President George W. Bush, who asked “[w]hy all
of a sudden a Middle Eastern company is held to a different standard than a
British one.”319
Finally, two adverse actions resulted from Congress’s campaign. First,
Congress passed a law to prohibit DPW from purchasing P&O.320 This may
be the only time in U.S. history—certainly, recent U.S. history—where Congress forbid a foreign investment by naming the two entities involved.321 The
link between congressional action and discriminatory behavior could not be
clearer. Second, one year later, Congress passed another law—the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act. This law stemmed from the potential
threat that foreign investment posed to U.S. national security.
F. Russian Investment
A word about Russia is also in order. Would the United States act any
differently if the investor were Russian instead of Chinese or Japanese? In
the absence of sizeable Russian investment in the United States, it is difficult
to say. Even before the United States imposed sanctions in 2014, Russia invested less than either India or Venezuela.322 Still, given the long history of
animosity between the United States and Russia (and its predecessor, the Soviet Union), surely the United States would treat Russian investment with the
same suspicion that it has directed towards Asian investment. Yet, that turns
out not to be the case. As Obama’s first Commerce Secretary, Democrat Gary
Locke, stated:
318 Paul Blustein & Eric Rich, Security Programs, Unions Would Stay at Ports, WASH. POST (Feb. 22,
2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/21/AR2006022101924_
pf.html; Adam Davidson, Most U.S. Port Terminals Are Foreign-Run, NPR (Feb. 26, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5234177. Since most major shipping companies
are foreign, many U.S. ports would be operated by foreign-owned companies. See Drewry’s Annual Review of Global Container Terminals Operators, THE MAR. EXECUTIVE (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.maritime-executive.com/pressrelease/Drewrys-Annual-Review-of-Global-Container-Terminals-Operators2013-08-27. The top ten came from Singapore, Hong Kong, Netherlands, UAE, China, Netherlands,
China, Korea, Taiwan, and Germany. Id.
319 Etter, supra note 155.
320 See CONG. REC. 152, 3036 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006).
321 I found no other instances where Congress directly blocked an investment by passing a law. In the
CNOOC case, Congress passed legislation that would require a 120-day review period. That lengthy period, in turn, killed the deal.
322 See Organization for International Investment, Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: 2016 Report,
http://ofii.org/sites/default/files/Foreign%20Direct%20
Investment%20in%20the%20United
%20States%202016%20Report.pdf.
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I am proud to be able to say that the United States is more receptive
to foreign investment than any other country in the world. No proposed Russian investment in the United States has been rejected, and,
in fact, Russian companies have made very significant investments in
areas such as steel, mining and retail petroleum. These investments
benefit the United States, as well as Russia.323

Locke also mentioned cooperative arrangements between “Boeing,
Motorola, and Microsoft, and their Russian partners.”324 Locke’s predecessor
under the George W. Bush administration, Commerce Secretary Carlos
Gutierrez, made similar overtures to Russian companies in the U.S. gas sector.325 Even in sensitive sectors such as oil, aviation, and advanced technology, the United States has expressed willingness to work with Russian companies, despite almost a century of antagonism.
Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that the United States
would oppose a particular Russian investment. If that were the case, political
actors would likely point to the long history of mistrust between Russia and
the United States, Russia’s destabilizing invasions of Crimea and Georgia,
its support for the Syrian regime, or the clash of values of our two political
systems. They would probably not talk about Russian ethnicity, clannishness,
or lack of sophistication, as they did for Middle Eastern, Japanese and Chinese investors.
V. PROTECTING ASIAN INVESTMENT
In prior parts, this Article has outlined a series of discriminatory actions
involving Asian investment. We have seen the harm this causes: both in terms
of forgone foreign investment, and to the image of the United States as both
racially tolerant and open to foreign investment. This final Part asks what, if
anything, can be done about it.326 Anti-Asian sentiment has circulated in public, political, and legal discourses for almost two centuries. It is unlikely that
any one form of redress will extirpate such deeply held suspicions.
I offer two possible ways to mitigate some of the harm discussed above.
Part IV.A offers ways to improve the CFIUS review process, in particular to
make that opaque body more transparent and less subject to political or racial
bias. Part IV.B takes a page from international investment law and urges the

323 Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke, Remarks at U.S.–Russia Business Summit (July 2, 2009)
(Westlaw) (emphasis added). Ambassador William Burns also noted “no Russian investment in the United
States has ever been turned down in the CFIUS process.” See Ambassador Burns, Addresses American
Chamber of Commerce, U.S. FED NEWS, Apr. 23, 2008.
324 Id.
325 RF [Russian Federation] accession to WTO allow it to take powerful position – Gutierrez, ITARTASS WORLD SERV., June 25, 2008.
326 I thank Cassandra Robertson for helping me think through the issues in this Part.
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adoption of pre-entry national treatment, which will ensure that foreign investors receive treatment equal to that enjoyed by domestic ones.
A. CFIUS: Improving Transparency
For the past several decades, CFIUS has largely served its mandate of
permissively screening foreign investment. When active, formally and otherwise, foreign investment has frequently hailed from Asia. CFIUS was not
simply created to monitor “Middle Eastern” investment. CFIUS was also a
reaction to Japanese investment in the 1980s. Even if the concern was only
economic nationalism (and that seems dubious), the language used to describe the Japanese threat drew on Orientalism. In 1990, President Bush divested CITIC, the Chinese aviation state-owned enterprise, again on CFIUS’
guidance. In the late 2000s and early 2010s, CFIUS blocked several Chinese
technology investments. It also recommended divestiture in Ralls. One could
probably not establish a housing or employment discrimination claim based
on such scant evidence.327 Yet the paucity of reliable information on CFIUS
feeds the perception that the United States disfavors Asian investors. A more
transparent CFIUS process, reporting more fully to the investor and public,
could help address this gap.
Under the 2007 FINSA, CFIUS annually reports to Congress.328 The
expurgated version of that report is publicly available, but offers incomplete
information about investment activity, such as the number of investigations
conducted by CFIUS, the investor’s home country, industry, and other statistics.329 It does not, however, link the number of investigations to a particular
country. Thus, one cannot discern whether CFIUS investigates Chinese companies at a higher rate than European companies.
The annual report does produce at least one statistical incongruity. From
2011 to 2013, Chinese companies filed 54 notices, more than any other country.330 Considering the small amount of Chinese investment in the United
States during that period—just 0.3% (three-tenths of one percent) of all

327 A recent empirical study of CFIUS decisions concludes there is no basis of discrimination. Yet,
they study only cover five years of data, and does not cover the first three decades of the body’s existence.
See Paul Connell & Tian Huang, Note: An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Examining Foreign Investment
Regulations, 39 YALE J. INT’L L. 131 (2014).
328 Recent studies have noted the paucity of information revealed by CFIUS. See, e.g., David Zaring,
CFIUS as a Congressional Notification Service, 83 SO. CAL. L. REV. 81 (2009). Zaring analyzes the “few
publicly available mitigation agreements imposed by the Committee on foreign acquirers,” and finds that
“some CFIUS agreements look more alike than others.” Id. at 89.
329 See Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Annual Report to Congress for Calendar Year 2013 (Public/Unclassified Version), Feb. 2015, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/2014%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20for%20Public%20Release.pdf.
330 Id. at 17.
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FDI—this number assumes additional significance.331 U.K. companies filed
49 notices, but accounted for 18% of inbound investment, sixty times more
than China.332 In other words, Chinese companies approach the U.S. market
with caution, likely due to the heightened scrutiny CFIUS and Congress have
directed at Chinese investment.
The opacity of CFIUS procedure has come under criticism. How can we
pry open the “black box?”333 Many improvements are imaginable, but we
narrow our inquiry to three.334 First, the CFIUS review process is rigorous.
Guidance is available, either in the form of Treasury guidelines or the legal
counsel of a fancy Washington law firm.335 Without such guidance, the investor may fail to “articulate, early on, a clear and consistent rationale for the
transaction.”336 As one former CFIUS staff member put it, the “rules are intentionally ambiguous to afford regulators maximum discretion.”337 In part,
that discretion helps protect CFIUS’s classified intelligence assessment. But
it also provides some cover when the Committee disapproves of a transaction
but fails to articulate the reason why.
Second, foreign investors may need more information than the government provides. In Ralls, the D.C. Circuit found that the Obama Administration failed to provide material information to Ralls, thereby violating its due
process rights.338 In prosecutorial terms, CFIUS failed to hand over material
evidence to Ralls, arguably preventing the company from understanding the

331 See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Investment Position
in the United States on a Historical-Cost Basis, 2013, https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal.htm.
332 Id.
333 See, e.g., Jose W. Fernandez, Lessons from the Trenches, INT’L FIN. L. REV., July/Aug. 2014, at
44; Todd Millen & Michael Sussman, Regulatory: A Brief Guide to CFIUS, INSIDE COUNSEL, May 31,
2002, http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/05/31/regulatory-a-brief-guide-to-cfius.
334 There is no shortage of commentary on how to reform CFIUS. See, e.g., Jonathan Wakely & Lindsay Windsor, Ralls on Remand: U.S. Investment Policy and the Scope of CFIUS’ Authority , 48 INT’L
LAW. 105, 121 (2014) (suggesting stricter limits on CFIUS’ authority to enter mitigation agreements);
Derek Scissors, A Better Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Heritage Foundation
Issue Brief #3844, HERITAGE.ORG (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/
reports/2013/01/enhancing-the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius;
Yiheng
Feng, Note, “We Wouldn’t Transfer Title to the Devil”: Consequences of the Congressional Politicization
of Foreign Direct Investment on National Security Grounds, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 253 300–03
(2009) (arguing CFIUS should have better mitigation procedures); Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment after the Dubai Ports Controversy: Has the U.S. Government Finally Figured Out how to
Balance Foreign Threats to National Security Without Alienating Foreign Companies?, 34 J. CORP. L.
293, 311–14 (2008) (recommending, inter alia, the creation of a new committee to review all FDI, and the
repeal of mandatory investigations for government-controlled investments).
335 See Notice, Dep’t of Treasury, Office of investment Security; Guidance Concerning the National
Security Review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74568 (Dec.
8, 2008).
336 Fernandez, supra note 333, at 45.
337 Id. at 44.
338 Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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national security implications of its acquisition. Since CFIUS is both prosecutor (compiling evidence) and judge (making decisions based on that evidence), its failure to share evidence casts doubt on its ability to act independently. It is critical, then, to ensure that the foreign investor has a
meaningful opportunity to see, analyze and rebut the evidence that CFIUS
has gathered.339
Third, once CFIUS renders its decision, investors have no way to challenge it. Indeed, the Exon-Florio amendments specifically preclude judicial
review of the President’s decision.340 Ralls revealed that courts can review
CFIUS procedure to ensure certain constitutional rights of due process. The
introduction of an appeals mechanism, either within CFIUS itself or in an
outside body, such as federal courts, would ensure that CFIUS decisions have
a firm factual basis, and do not result from political or racial ructions of the
day. Federal judicial review of agency actions is common in many areas of
the law, and courts are well equipped to handle sensitive or confidential information.341
B. Congress: Acts and Omissions
Congress also has a role to play. First, its members should understand
the importance of foreign investment in the United States generally and in
their respective districts specifically. Scarcely a week goes by without news
of another Chinese investment in the United States, and not just in the major
markets such as New York or California.342 If Congress understood the extent
to which foreign investment benefited their constituencies—through jobs, research and development, economic activity and secondary effects (services
catering to the employees)—they may find it harder to oppose foreign investment.343
In this respect, a recent report by the National Committee on U.S.–China
339 Jeremy Zucker & Hrishikesh Hari, Gone With the Wind: The Ralls Transaction and Implications
for Foreign Investment in the United States, 9 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 182, 190 (2014).
340 The Exon-Florio Amendments foreclose judicial review of decisions made by the President. See
50 U.S.C. § 2170(e) (1988).
341 Of course, courts could not do this without congressional authorization. Even if the judiciary has
such authority, it must determine whether its review would “implicate political, military, economic or
other choices ‘not essentially legal [in] nature.’” Hondros v. U.S. Civil Service Comm’n, 720 F.2d 278,
293 (3d Cir. 1983).
342 For instance, the New York Times reported that a Chinese state-owned enterprise signed a $566million dollar contract to supply railway cars for Boston’s Orange and Red Lines. $60 million will go to
setting up a factory in Springfield, one of the poorest cities in the Commonwealth. See Jad Mouawad, A
Rail Firm From China Puts a Toe Into the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2015, at B1. See also, Randy Ludlow,
Kasich spills the beans on Chinese trade trip to Ohio, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (June 9, 2015),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/blogs/the-daily-briefing/2015/06/6-9-15-kasich-cain.html (noting a
$330 million investment from a Chinese-owned glass company).
343 Some of these investments have helped bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. See Mouawad,
supra note 342 (subway care construction); Ludlow, supra note 342 (glass construction).
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Relations and the Rhodium Group is instructive.344 The report tracks fourteen
years of Chinese foreign direct investment into each of the 435 congressional
districts. To be sure, China remains a comparatively small investor in the
United States—twentieth in the world, holding 0.3% of total FDI in the
United States.345 Yet Chinese investors employ about 80,000 U.S. workers
and spend hundreds of millions of dollars in research and development annually.346 They have invested in a diverse array of sectors, including oil, technology, and renewable energy—the very sectors that Congress and CFIUS
warned about in prior years. Yet, as far as we know, no company has shut
down, no terrorist attacks have occurred, and no trade secrets have been stolen. This Article may help U.S. politicians realize that Chinese investment,
properly screened, can serve the same useful purposes that foreign investment has traditionally played in the United States.
Second, Congress could also consider providing additional investment
protections through legislation. Since nations enjoy autonomy to regulate foreign investment on their own terms, the legislature can decide how to treat
foreign investors. The national treatment standard demands equal treatment
for both the foreign and domestic investor.347 The foreign investor should not
encounter discrimination in market access, applicable laws, access to justice,
due process, and so on. In most investment treaties,348 the national treatment
obligation arises after the host state formally approves the investment.349 This
post-entry model preserves the state’s strong gatekeeping function regarding
foreign investment. It simply prohibits objectionable foreign investors from
entering the market in the first place.
The North American model, also known as pre-entry national treatment,
accords equal treatment to foreign investors when they acquire the interest,

344 National Committee on U.S.–China Relations & Rhodium Group, New Neighbors: Chinese Investment in the United States by Congressional District, NCUSCR.ORG (May 2015) [hereinafter Chinese
Investment Report], https://www.ncuscr.org/sites/default/files/Chinese-FDI-in-US_Full-Report-2015NCUSCR_0.pdf.
345 See Bureau of Economic Analysis, Foreign Direct Invest in the U.S.: Balance of Payments and
Direct Investment Position Data, https://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdibal.htm. As of 2014, the most
recent figures available, China has invested approximately $9.47 billion, of a total of $2.90 trillion, in the
United States. Even if we include all investment from Hong Kong—where some PRC capital originates—
the total would be $17.07 billion—less than Korea, Singapore, Hungary or Norway. Id.
346 Chinese Investment Report, supra note 344, at 7.
347 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, National Treatment, 1,
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/11 (Vol. IV) (1999).
348 European states have traditionally only granted post-entry national treatment. M. Sornarajah, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 336–37 (6th ed. 2006). Developing states usually provide
post-entry national treatment in their bilateral investment treaties. Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Significance of South-South BITS for the International Investment Regime: A Quantitative Analysis, 30 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 101, 118 (2013) (finding South-South BITs far less likely to provide robust national treatment protections than North-South BITs.
349 Poulsen, supra note 348, at 119.
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even if the state has not specifically authorized it.350 That is, the state cedes
regulatory autonomy in many fields, usually spelled out in a treaty appendix
or “negative list.” The default setting is that foreign investors enjoy the “right
of entry” or “right to establish” in the host state.351 Corporations enjoy enhanced autonomy under pre-entry national treatment. The state has, in effect,
approved the investment and agreed not to discriminate against them.
The United States has made pre-entry national treatment a cornerstone
of its foreign investment policy for decades. Beginning with its 1983 model
Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”), all U.S. BITs require pre-entry national
treatment of the partner country.352 Because pre-entry national treatment is a
product of treaty law, and Congress must ratify investment treaties, Congress
has the power to extend this protection. The United States could extend preentry national treatment to all foreign investors—even in the absence of a
bilateral investment treaty. This would bring the United States’ own practice
far closer to the goal of universalizing pre-entry national treatment. It would
also provide a legal guarantee to the long held mantra of openness to foreign
investment.
Were the U.S. government to deny a foreign investor national treatment,
a remedy could take one of several forms. If CFIUS or Congress interferes
with a foreign investment without a legally compelling justification, a court
could grant declaratory relief (e.g. the investor’s rights were violated), injunctive relief (requiring CFIUS to take action, and perhaps even authorizing
the investment), or monetary damages (lost profits or otherwise). Such protections may not prevent another Dubai Ports World or CNOOC situation.
They might, however, provide legal remedies to foreign investors and signal
to the political branches that their authority to regulate investment has limits.
In the long run, the United States is unlikely to offer pre-entry national
treatment to foreign investors in the absence of a treaty. Unless the United
States gains national treatment from a partner country, there is no reason why
it would offer something for nothing. To be sure, the United States is capable
of acting unilaterally, particularly if long-term commercial interests are at
stake.353 Congress has the ability to do this, either by passing a law like the
350 This standard was part of NAFTA, and has since spread to BITs between Canada and China, for
instance. D.M. McRae and A.L.C. de Mestral, Canada-China Foreign Investment Agreement, 49
CANADIAN YB. INT’L L. 202, 224–25 (2009). China has also agreed to pre-entry national treatment with
the United States. See He Weiwen, A High Standard Bilateral Investment Treaty, CHINA US FOCUS (July
24, 2014), http://www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/a-high-standard-bilateral-investment-treaty.
351 ANDREW PAUL NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW & PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES:
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 158 (2009).
352 1983 Draft Bilateral Investment Treaty of the United States, Art. II(b), quoted in Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201,
n.119 (1998).
353 Antirust and corruption are two areas where the United States has insisted its domestic law may
have extraterritorial application. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165
(2004) (“No one denies that America’s antitrust laws, when applied to foreign conduct, can interfere with
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FCPA, or by serially ratifying BITs with pre-entry national treatment provisions. However, Congress does not appear quite as attached to pre-entry national treatment as it has been to other principles of commercial law.
VI. CONCLUSION
One frequently hears that the United States is the “most hospitable country” towards forward direct investment. This Article does not dislodge the
broad thrust of that claim. Instead, it shows how U.S. law of foreign investment grew out of several responses to Asian investment, and that this response was not based solely on objective or political criteria like economic
nationalism or national security. The evidence, pieced together from the
1970s to the 2000s, punctuates this notion of U.S. openness.
We know U.S. treatment of Asian investment has not always been equal
to that of Western investment. As a recent Chinese article summarized:
Although the U.S. is one of the world’s most open markets, its security
review process for foreign investment is particularly stringent. For
Chinese companies especially, the U.S.’s national security review
seems to wear “tinted glasses.” From the early defeat of CNOOC’s
bid for Unocal and Huawei’s thwarted attempts to invest in the U.S.,
to the recent failure by Sany to invest in wind farms, Chinese investors
face especially interesting security barriers in U.S. mergers and acquisitions.354

At the present moment, many Chinese investors suspect that the United
States opposes Chinese investment. Indeed, Daniel Chow surmises that
China’s interest in BITs stems in large part from its frustration with U.S.
barriers to Chinese investment.355 How can we make sense of the United
States’ current unease with Chinese investment, and the past four decades of
opposition to Asian investment? Three factors help make sense of this history.
First, national security—whose implication is highly implausible in
most instances—plays a role. With advances in cybersecurity, one cannot
know ex ante the extent to which an acquisition may disrupt U.S. national

a foreign nation’s ability to regulate its own commercial affairs.”). See Andrew Brady Spalding, Four
Unchartered Corners of Anti-Corruption Law: In Search of Remedies to the Sanctioning Effect, 2012
WIS. L. REV. 661, 662 (reciting the frequent complaint that U.S. anticorruption law handicaps U.S. businesses).
354 Zhongguo Qiye Ruhe Fangfan Meiguo Touzi Anquan Shencha Fengxian [How Can Chinese Companies Guard Against the Risk of U.S. Investment Security Review], 21 SHIJI JINGJI BAODAO [21ST
CENTURY ECON. TIMES] (Sept. 7, 2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20150907/084423172831.shtml.
355 See, e.g., Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Wants a Bilateral Investment Treaty with the United
States, B.U. INT’L L.J. 421, 442 (2015). This sentiment also surfaced in the conversations the author had
with officials from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Commerce in Summer, 2015.
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security. Precisely for this reason, CFIUS has a thorough, though opaque,
vetting process.
Second, economic concerns reverberate throughout these discussions.
As noted, investments from certain Asian jurisdictions—South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, for example—attract little of the umbrage reserved for
China, Japan, and certain Middle Eastern jurisdictions. This animosity stems
from a fear that the United States is slipping, losing its international prestige,
or fading into obscurity. This is not true as an empirical matter; the United
States continues to enjoy the “pole position” in the global prestige race. But
perceptions frequently overshadow the truth. The thought of receiving “reverse investment,” and of somehow being subjugated to economic forces
originating from Asia, still bothers many people from the United States and
some U.S. politicians. A similar anxiety does not attach to investments from
Germany, the United Kingdom, or France, the fourth, fifth and sixth largest
economies, respectively. This leads to the final point.
Third, race and national origin still matter. Having analyzed an array of
statements, actions and decisions rendered by government officials over four
decades, this Article still observes special censure for investors from Asia.
Westerners, even now, account for the overwhelming majority of inbound
foreign investment. Yet Chinese investment—tiny by comparison—still rankles. U.S. politicians often react to Chinese investment, whether in pork manufacturing or computer software, with a suspiciousness in large part disproportionate to the actual threat. The language of opposition to Asian
investment has grown less strident from the 1970s and 1980s to the present.
But the underlying discomfort with a powerful, economically strong and internationally active Asia persists.
Many predict that the twenty-first century will belong to “Asia,” as
Asian countries gain wealth, power, military strength, and other capacities.
This rise need not come at the expense of the United States, any more than
the United States’ own rise impoverished Germany, Britain, or France. If
people from the United States can avoid reflexive reactions to Asian investment, the United States may actually live up to its reputation for receptivity
to foreign capital. That would pose a model for the rest of the world.
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